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PREFACE 
This  report  is  in  response to a request  by  the then  Director General  of  DGXXIV,  H. 
Reichenbach  to undertake a reanalysis  of the organisation  of scientific advice  in  the 
light of the last two years  experience with  the new system  of expert  recruitment and 
working  procedures.  Our report  has  evolved  over  several  months  in  response  to a 
number of inputs, public hearings and discussions with organisations and  individuals in 
Europe and elsewhere.  We have greatly benefited from the administrative support of 
our colleagues in  DG SANCO: Takis Daskaleros, Daniele Datto, Stephen Hutchins and 
Jeannie Vergnettes.  The views presented in this report are our own. 
Philip James 
Fritz Kemper 
Gerard Pascal 
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The  mandate  for  this  report  is  set  out  in  Appendix  1.  The  mandate  relates  to 
arrangements for providing  scientific advice to the Commission.  The system changed 
markedly in 1997 and has been further developed in October 1999 during the course of 
our deliberations.  The recent success of the  EU  in  establishing its scientific advisory 
system within Directorate General XXIV,  now termed SANCO, with  its responsibility for 
public  health  and  consumer protection  now  needs  to be  developed  further for many 
reasons as listed in the Table below. 
The need for restructuring the arrangements for scientific scrutiny and action 
within the EU. 
•:• The Amsterdam Treaty emphasised the need  to include health  issues  in  policy making  and 
action at a European level. 
•:• The health of children and  adults is  markedly different within societies and across Europe and 
is explained by, social and environmental conditions, diet and smoking habits. 
•:• The EU's enlargement will amplify these differences because the markedly greater burden of 
ill health in Central and Eastern Europeans will highlight public health problems of the EU. 
•:• There  is  currently  no  coherent  EU  surveillance  system  dealing  with  public  health  and  its 
principal determinants. 
•:•Intense public,  parliamentary, industrial and  international concerns relate to agricultural, food 
and  environmental  problems  as  demonstrated  by the BSE  and  dioxin  crises  and  the beef 
hormone disputes of the last few months. 
•:• The public's confidence in both governmental and scientific analyses and actions has declined 
because of a perceived bias towards political and industrial rather than consumer interests. 
•:•Industrial groups,  keen  to produce novel  biotechnological or other products,  are exasperated 
by the complex and protracted system for clearing their products. 
•:• Few Europeans  understand  or  accept the present system of accountability in  Europe where 
national  Ministers, the Commission and  European Parliament all  seem to be involved,  but 
where  responsibility  for  specific  issues  or  crisis  management  is  hard  to  discern.  This 
disjointed responsibility accentuates consumers' concern when  major scares and  problems 
develop which may affect their health. 
•:• Current EU scientific analyses, policy-making and safety auditing are currently perceived to be 
isolated from any effective public or parliamentary scrutiny.  This may have contributed to 
the public's disenchantment with European affairs 
Page 5 of 74 On the basis of these concerns and the expected enlargement of the European Union, 
the four options proposed by the Commission in  its mandate were examined with  help 
from a number of individuals and external bodies (Appendix 2).  In  addition a Hearing 
was  held  for  Commission  officials  from  all  the  related  DGs  and  Agencies.  The four 
options were a directorate within a current or new Directorate General, an  independent 
Commission  service,  an  inter-institutional  office or an  independent agency.  Each  of 
these  mechanisms,  as  currently  established  by  the  EU  Commission,  has  both 
advantages  and  disadvantages  and  other  options  are  possible.  The  proposal 
presented  in  this  report  is  initially confined to the mandate which essentially concerns 
the  process  of  risk  assessment,  as  part  of  the  provision  of  scientific  advice.  The 
mandate includes public health  issues which in  non-Member States, e.g.  the US,  are 
primarily the responsibility of special  centres  such  as  the  Centre for Disease Control 
(CDC)  in  Atlanta.  Unfortunately  there  is  no  comparable  organisation  in  Europe. 
Organisations such as the CDC has a crucial influence in ensuring that the activities of 
industrially sensitive issues  such  as  those  handled  by the  FDA  are  geared  to public 
health concerns.  Some of the benefits and drawbacks relating to the development of a 
system analogous to the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) are also set out. 
In  principle  there  should  be  a  system  for  providing  scientific  advice  which  is 
independent,  transparent,  of excellent  scientific quality and  capable  of being  readily 
understood by non-experts, by Parliament, Member States and industry, as  well  as  by 
the Commission.  There is  also the need  to have the capacity to respond  rapidly and 
effectively to issues  of  public,  industrial  and  political  concern.  This  will  require  novel 
arrangements.  It  is  concluded  that  current scientific advice  relates  to  many areas  in 
addition to those of food  safety and  that these other public health issues are in  health 
terms  a  greater  burden  on  society than  the  effects  of  poor  food  safety which  has 
dominated  thinking  so  far.  It  is  noted  that  currently  the  assessment  of  drugs  is 
conducted  by a European  Agency for the  Evaluation  of  Medicinal  Products  (EMEA), 
based  in  London.  The present proposal is  that the new institution should deal with all 
other public health, environmental and  food  issues.  A Brussels based  organisation is 
considered essential to allow very rapid interaction with the Commission, the European 
Parliament and  Member States.  This is  particularly important during the crises relating 
to food and health which can  be expected to recur. The proposed system should have 
many of the features  of the  present inter-institutional  system,  i.e.  OLAF,  in  order to 
cope with the scale of the problem, the need for urgent action and the desirability of a 
proper interplay with the major EU  and Member State political and public bodies as well 
as the public and industry. 
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needs  to be  good  Member State  interaction  detailed  conjoint work with  international 
organisations and  a scientific and  administrative capacity to support the scientific work 
and to develop a series of effective units  .. 
Figure 1: The proposed structure of the new EU institution 
INSTITUTIONS 
EUROPEAN  FOOD  AND  PUBLIC 
HEALTH  AUTHORITY 
Scientific Steering 
Committee: public health 
Institutions and 
Stakeholders (Observers) 
Sectoral Committees 
Joint Board 
To signify the different nature of this organisation, it might be called an Authority rather 
than  an  Agency.  It  would  have  some  parallels  with  the  US  Food  and  Drug 
Administration, but be seen to be more independent of political and  industrial interests. 
It would  link closely with  the Commission.  The title European  Food and  Public Health 
Authority (EFPHA) would  signify the parallels but substitute public health concerns for 
the drug  assessment and  drug  surveillance work which  is  dealt with  by  analysis  and 
needs to include groups and mechanisms for ensuring: 
•  An  effective  system  for  monitoring  European  Public  Health.  This  will  require  a 
totally  new  approach  at  a  European  level  with  some  EU  nations  developing 
surveillance systems for health for the first time.  In addition there will be a need for 
the audit of national surveillance and control processes. Surveillance systems using 
comparable  techniques  will  be  needed  to  assess  trends  in  public  health  and 
problems  relating  to the food  chain.  The Environmental Agency will  also provide 
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EFPHA. 
•  Policy analysis and options for policy developments for ensuring public health to all 
Member States.  This will link the risk managers within the Commission. 
•  A  legal  unit  for  evaluating  the  implications  of  scientific  opinions  relating  to 
regulatory and  legislation  proposals.  Regulations  and  laws will  continue to require 
processing  by  the  Commission,  reference  to  Parliament  and  co-decision  making 
with National Ministers. 
•  A research analysis and  research policy group: there is a need for the Commission 
to develop  a coherent  programme  of  research  of relevance  to  public  health  and 
food safety, e.g. as  in the US FDA system 
•  A communications unit to operate directly for the EFPHA. 
•  A  role  in  crisis  management.  The  Authority  has  to  be  involved  in  crisis 
management.  The institution's function is  not assumed to extend to regulatory and 
control responsibilities as well  as those dealing primarily with scientific advice. The 
practices  of  policy making,  research,  management and  the auditing of measures 
relating  to  public  health,  the food  chain  and  the  environment  are  often  currently 
dealt with  separately by a number of European and  Member State organisations. 
The scientific committees at  present provide risk assessments which contribute to 
risk management decision making.  Issues of political or industrial concern are also 
put  to  the  committees.  The  current  risk  assessment  process,  however,  has 
negligible input from  those  dealing  with  issues  of  risk  management,  on  practical 
options for change or on the validity and effectiveness of control measures.  So the 
committees are  handicapped in  providing  a realistic and  valid  analysis  of the true 
risks currently faced  by the European consumer.  It is  clear that the public wish to 
know  the  true  risks  of  different  measures.  Confining  a  new  organisation  to 
providing  advice  which  is  divorced  from  the  realities  of what  consumers  have  to 
confront will  lead to further disenchantment with the European system for assuring 
public health and is therefore unwise. 
These components would allow the EFPHA to relate openly to the European public but 
also  interact with  the  European  Parliament  and  with  Member State  organisations  as 
well as with the Commission. 
The Authority would  need to have substantial scientific support as  in  the US  FDA and 
new  mechanisms  for engaging  with  other  major  international  organisations,  e.g.  the 
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organisations should be invited to take part in the committees assessing risk. 
The Authority should be run by a Board of 9 people chosen for their independence and 
breadth of vision. Member State, Commission and  Parliamentary should be involved in 
the  appointment  processes.  Consumer,  public  health,  environmental  and  industrial 
groups should be consulted. 
Funding for the Authority should  be mostly from public sources and  be determined by 
the Commission and  Parliament but with  part of the funds coming from charges made 
for work done,  e.g.  in  scrutinising  novel  foods  and  processes.  Experience with  BSE 
has  demonstrated  that  major  issues  of  intense  public  concern  cannot  be  left to  the 
market  place  but  clearance  of  new  pesticides,  additives,  novel  foods,  cosmetics, 
GMOs,  consumer  utensils  etc.  could  properly  be  considered  as  involving  an 
appropriate  fee.  The  system  could  be  developed  taking  account  of  the  EMEA's 
experience whilst recognising that the charges would need to make allowances for the 
industries involved. 
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The authors were asked  in  May 1999 to  undertake an  analysis  of how the European 
Union might improve on  the recent organisational changes  in the provision of scientific 
advice which the EU  introduced in response to the BSE crisis.  The Mandate is set out 
in Appendix 1. 
The  European  Parliament  had  become  concerned  in  1996  that  the  European 
Commission  was  not  taking  the  threat  of  BSE  seriously  enough  following  the  UK 
announcement of a probable link between BSE in  cattle and  v.CJD in  humans.  Their 
accusation was  that the  policy-making,  auditing  and  formal  safety controls governing 
the food  chain  were  not  being  primarily conducted  in  the  public's  interest.  In  an  EU 
context,  many Parliamentarians expressed  concern that the compromises  involved  in 
achieving  consensus decisions  in  Standing  Committees  also involved  the  Committee 
being  linked  directly  to  the  EU  Directorates  concerned  primarily  with  industrial  and 
internal market issues and the needs of the agricultural industries. 
The provision  of scientific advice and  the development of standards  in  the  EU  were 
originally  substantially  geared  to  smoothing  out  the  discrepant  national  regulations 
which in  practice were becoming barriers to trade.  Since the 1992 Edinburgh Summit 
there  has  been  an  emphasis  on  subsidiarity whereby  national  bodies  were  brought 
back into the process  of analysis  and  with  a Council  of Ministers demand to limit the 
Commission's  role  only  to  resolving  disputes  or  discrepancies  between  national 
systems of regulation.  Given the additional  need  for rapid  industrial clearance of new 
products or processes, a set of new EU  procedures were developed to ensure that the 
initial clearance of a product by one  Member State did  not lead  to  long  delays  while 
other Member States considered the original clearance.  The Commission then became 
involved with its own  scientific review when objections arose.  In  relation to some food 
processing  legislation,  however,  the  legal  EU  texts  still  required  the  mandatory 
consultation of the Scientific Committee for Food  before Community approval and  did 
not require initial risk assessment by Member States. 
The  locations  of  the  scientific  committees  within  the  Commission's  industrial  and 
agricultural DGs were seen  by consumers, other public health  interests and  European 
Parliamentarians  concerned  by  the  BSE  crisis  as  indicative  of  the  dominance  of 
industrial interests and  a neglect of consumers' safety and well-being.  In  response to 
this Parliamentary challenge, the Commission  in  1997 dissolved the principal advisory 
Scientific Committees and transferred staff from a variety of directorates to expand the 
Directorate  General  (DG  XXIV)  responsible  for  representing  and  safeguarding 
Page 10 of 74 Consumer interests.  The committees responsible for the evaluation of medicines and 
the  protection  of  workers  were  not  included.  In  practice  the  Directorate  General 
(DGXXIV)  had,  until  then,  been  concerned  mainly  with  the  economic  interests  of 
consumers. This reorganisation was therefore seen to reflect a fundamental change in 
thinking  for  the  Commission.  The  transfer  of  the  committees  to  DGXXIV  was 
considered  therefore  a  crucial  move  in  symbolising  the  shift  in  the  Commission's 
position.  The  Commission  also  displayed  its  renewed  commitment  to  excellence, 
independence and transparency in  the procedures  it developed for recruiting experts. 
Experts'  particular  financial  interests  had  to  be  specified,  there  was  a  renewed 
emphasis  procedurally on  independence and  a new approach to transparency.  The 
new DGXXIV development involved an open competition in June- September 1997 for 
new advisory committees,  supported  by a scientific secretariat with  responsibilities to 
ensure  that  industrial  or  political  pressures  did  not  impinge  on  the  Committees' 
deliberations. 
During the course of our deliberations major changes have occurred with the advent of 
a  new  President  and  Commissioners.  There  has  been  a  restructuring  of  some 
Directorate Generalates and  this has  reinforced the new role for DGXXIV.  The small 
section of DGV dealing with public health issues and health promotion, the component 
of DGVI  concerned with  animal  and  plant health,  veterinary matters  relating  to public 
health,  animal  feed  and  issues  relating  to  infringements  in  these specific fields  have 
been  incorporated  into DGXXIV which  is  now termed  DG  SANCO.  Furthermore,  the 
new responsible Commissioner has  a more focused  role than  his  predecessor. Table 
1.1  sets out the current disposition of responsibilities. 
The  mandate  for  this  work  is  narrow  in  scope  since  it,  in  effect,  specifies  the  risk 
assessment process as  the principal  issue to be addressed.  This report accords with 
this mandate but adds  a dimension of thinking to address  some of the  bigger issues 
now at stake.  A strategic approach is taken,  recognising that the development of new 
arrangements must be  seen  as  part of a coherent system in  an  expanding  EU  where 
the European  public needs to be reassured by explicit processes and  practices which 
demonstrate  that  their  health  and  well-being  are  being  safeguarded  at  a  time  of 
extremely rapid societal and industrial change. 
In  this analysis  other issues are included appropriate for the next  10-20 years  as  the 
Union expands  and  takes  on  a wide range of responsibilities  commensurate with  the 
increasing international role of the European Union. 
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Map of the different Community authorities relating to Health and Consumer 
Health Protection issues with a designation of their status after the October 1999 
reorganisation of responsibilities. 
Risk Assessment  Risk Management 
DG HEALTH AND CONSUMER PROTECTION 
Rapid alert system 
DG  SANCO  Scientific  Committees:  all  -
consumer  health  issues  (see  mandates  in 
Appendix 3) 
Management  of  the  general  directive  on  the  safety of 
consumer products 
Inspection (FVO - Food and Veterinary Office) 
(from October) 
EMEA 
- authorisation  of pharmaceutical  products 
Responsible for veterinary legislation, (animal health and 
public  health),  hygiene  of  products  of  animal  origin, 
animal  feed  legislation,  pesticides  (authorisation  of 
pesticides and MRL), 
Responsible  with  DG  Trade  for  the  management  of 
external  relations  related  to  SPS  (Sanitary  and 
Phytosanitary Agreement) 
(in  the  field  of  human  medicine  and  -
veterinary medicine) 
Responsible for Public Health legislation (e.g. tobacco, in 
the future blood products) and Health Promotion 
DG  EMPLOYMENT  AND  SOCIAL 
AFFAIRS 
Scientific committee 
Protection of the health of workers 
DG ENTREPRISES 
Food  legislation: (additives,  material  in  contact flavours, 
contaminants  (except  pesticides),  technological  aids, 
dietary products,  general  hygiene directive,  Novel  food, 
irradiation) 
Cosmetics 
Medical devices 
Part of chemical products (shared with DG  ENV) 
Pharmaceutical products 
-Responsible with  DG  Trade  for  the  implementation  of 
the  TBT  (Technical  Barriers  to  Trade)  agreement 
(GMOs, labelling etc.) 
DG AGRICULTURE 
-Wine legislation 
DG ENVIRONMENT 
GMOs (release in the environment) 
- Chemicals  (authorisation  of  new  substances  and  re-
evaluation of old substances 
- Radio nuclear protection 
- Air and water quality 
- DG EMPLOYEMENT AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS 
- Legislation for the protection of workers 
Potential technical support 
(scientific studies) analysis of products 
JRC 
±  REFERENCE LABORATORIES+ 
DG RESEARCH 
Page 12 of 74 2.  CURRENT UNRESOLVED ISSUES IN GAINING PUBLIC,  PARLIAMENTARY AND INDUSTRIAL 
CONFIDENCE IN THE EUROPEAN HANDLING OF PUBLIC HEALTH ISSUES. 
In  the  light  of  special  hearings  for  Commission  officials,  consumer  organisations, 
industry and  following the European  Parliaments  preliminary analysis of the problems 
of coping  with  food  crisis,  it  is  clear that there  are  a number of unresolved  issues. 
Perhaps  inevitably  there  are  intrinsic  differences  in  the  approach  of  the  public,  of 
industry and  of the  managers  of risk.  Part  of the problem  is  therefore  how to take 
account of these different sectors' perspectives and  needs whilst being  clear that any 
new system must operate primarily in the public interest. 
All three sectors agree that they seek to have scientific analyses and advice which are 
independent of sectoral or political influence, of excellent quality and  with transparent 
procedures. 
All  sectors  also wish  the  system  to  be  effective  and  able  to deliver  comprehensive 
opinions within a reasonable time.  Nevertheless, the interpretation of some principles 
by the public, industry, the Commission and  by Parliamentarians can  be very different. 
The perspectives of the different sectors are now set out. 
2.1.  Public confidence 
The public's attitude to public  health  issues  naturally depends on  the information 
and analyses presented to them by the media and  by those opinion leaders whom 
they have come to trust on  the basis of their own  experience.  EU  surveys show 
that the public has  the greatest faith  in  consumer representatives  and  the media 
with  political  parties,  government  agencies  and  the  Commission  being  least 
trusted.  The public's attitude is  naturally also geared to their own  concerns and to 
the  perceived  impact  of  governmental  processes  on  their  lives.  It  is  now  well 
recognised  what  features  of  policy  making  induce  the  greatest  concern  for  the 
public.  The more distant and  obscure the decision-making process and  the more 
uncertain but life-threatening the consequences of decisions made elsewhere, the 
greater  the  anxiety;  when  decisions  also  seem  to  be  either  made  or  heavily 
influenced by industrial or political forces with little concern for the public's welfare, 
then  the  greater the  public's  anger.  The  maximum  response  seems  to  relate  to 
food issues which from time immemorial have been - in all cultures - recognised as 
a matter of life and  death.  If scientific advice  is  to  be  organised  so that  public 
confidence in  European judgements and  actions improves, then account needs to 
be taken  not only of the public's general approach to new developments but also 
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valuable. 
When a group of Western Europeans with varied  backgrounds and encompassing 
the full range of intelligence is  given  the opportunity to evaluate,  with  meticulous 
expert help, the nature of scientific decision-making over issues such as the use of 
genetically  modified  organisms,  or  the  risks  of  SSE,  the  outcome  is,  perhaps 
surprisingly, to increase not to decrease their anxiety.  The citizen groups come to 
realise that their individual welfare is dependent on decisions made on the basis of 
so much  uncertainty.  Thus the traditional  governmental  and  scientific approach 
which  presumes  that  ignorance  is  the  real  problem  in  matters  relating  to 
environmental and  health hazards and that public "education" is the key to solving 
the problem is wrong.  It is now increasingly recognised that the public, through the 
analyses  conducted  by  the  media,  need  also  to  be  reassured  that  there  is  an 
excellent, independent and transparent system of scientific analysis of the highest 
standard.  Additional  systems  need  to  be  in  place to  show the  links  with  policy-
making,  risk management, control and  audit processes which are capable of rapid 
and effective action.  All of these components need to be conducted by groups or 
individuals  who  are  able,  trustworthy  and  manifestly  operating  in  the  interests 
primarily of the public with transparent structural arrangements demonstrating their 
effective interaction. 
Despite  the  transfer  of  the  scientific  advisory  system  to  DG  SANCO  and  its 
removal  from  direct  industrial  pressures,  the  present  structure  makes,  on  this 
basis, only a modest contribution to public confidence. It is claimed that there is still 
no  real  mechanism for either the public,  opinion  leaders  or the media to find  out 
rapidly how the EU system works, whether it is operating in the public interest, who 
responds to the analyses of risk, whether the response automatically induces risk 
reduction  processes, who controls these processes  and  what reassurances there 
are that any delay or failure is  highlighted and  remedied.  The population naturally 
judges matters on the basis of its experience of crises and how these are handled. 
It is also particularly interested in the link between the recognition of a problem, its 
evaluation  and  its  rapid  resolution.  Thus  the  conventional  scientific,  official  and 
political distinctions between  risk assessment,  risk management,  with  appropriate 
audit and  control systems and  the process of risk communication are irrelevant in 
the  public's  mind.  The  distinctions  which  are  crucial  to  effective  working  (see 
below) are often seen by the media and public as counterproductive particularly if it 
means that different groups can pass the blame from one to another. 
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management and  communication  provides  a highly professional  and  appropriate 
input.  There are also entirely proper answers to each of the challenges made by 
the  consumer  groups  but  the  overall  impression  is  that  the  drawbacks  of  the 
present  system  are  such  that  public  confidence  will  not  grow  unless  there  are 
structural changes in the way these issues of intense public concern are handled. 
On  the basis of these concerns it is considered that the current system within  DG 
SANCO is  useful because it allows debate and the evolution of scientific analyses. 
Nevertheless,  the  system  itself  needs  further  reform  to  bring  it  into  the  public 
domain,  i.e.  to  enhance  transparency.  It  also  needs  to  include  stakeholder 
involvement,  to  become  accountable,  i.e.  democratically  responsive  to  people's 
concerns  and  to allow a clear communication  system which  also vividly displays 
how the scientific assessment system links with both the effective management of 
crises  and  the  steady  rigorous  and  rational  pursuit  of  higher  health  and 
environmental standards in  the  public interest.  There is  also a need  to target the 
outcomes  of  scientific  analyses  and  policy  decisions  to  appropriate  societal 
groups.  The public  needs  to see that there is  consistency in  legislative process 
and  a proportion in  risk/benefit decision-making.  All  these factors are missing at 
present  as  far  as  the  public  is  concerned.  Thus  currently  there  is  no  public 
involvement with the committees' work,  no real  parliamentary scrutiny or linkage of 
any  substance  and  a  communication  scheme  which  usually  simply  puts  the 
minutes  and  scientifically written  reports  on  the  internet  without  explanation  or 
interpretation.  As  far as  even  a relatively sophisticated  member of the public  is 
concerned, there is  no evidence on  why particular mandates  are provided to the 
committees,  no information on  what will  happen to the reports,  no explanation  of 
how these reports are dealt with in the Commission, what leads the Commission to 
propose  different  or  modified  proposals  to  those  produced  by  Scientific 
Committees,  what  constitutes  a  Standing  Committee,  why  they  have  such 
influence.  and  how  this  links  to  Parliamentary  Scrutiny.  On  any  reasonable 
grounds  the  European  citizen  will  conclude  that  there  is  a democratic  deficit  in 
handling citizens' concerns and that the current system is  an  excellent scheme for 
ensuring that no single group takes responsibility and is accountable to the people. 
The present proposals take these issues into account. 
2.2.  Parliamentary involvement 
Three  factors  reflect  the  great  importance  now  being  placed  on  consumer 
interests, health and the environment within the EU.  First is the clear recognition in 
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at EU  level.  Secondly is the decision by the last Parliament, for the first time in  its 
history, to threaten the Commissioners' positions on  the grounds of their handling 
of the SSE crisis.  Third is the recent and,  to the media,  surprising decision of the 
new majority EU  parties  brought to  power  following  the June 1999 elections,  to 
select  preferentially  the  chairmanship  of  the  environment,  public  health  and 
consumer policy committee rather than  chairmanship of other committees dealing 
with  the  traditional  areas  of  the  EU's  power.  This  reflects  Parliamentary 
recognition that this area is  now of very great significance for both  Parliament and 
the Commission. 
There has  been  parliamentary committee debate  about  the  extent  to  which  the 
European Parliament should scrutinise or be involved in ratifying opinions such as 
the  recent  sse  analyses  of  BSE  in  relation  to  the  British  Date  Based  Export 
Scheme.  Originally MEPs demanded  to  be  involved  in  the  process  of scientific 
evaluation  but  this  was  not  taken  further other than  by  their  holding  two  public 
hearings  with  the  Commission  on  issues  relating  to  SSE.  No  special 
communication  channels  seem  to  have  been  opened  between  the  independent 
scientific  committees  and  the  European  Parliament  so scientific  committees  are 
unaware of specific Parliamentary concerns or requests.  There is also, at present, 
no strategy for any conjoint involvement  of parliamentarians  in  the processes  of 
EU  crisis  management.  Thus  there  seems  to  be  no  clear  focus  of  EU 
Parliamentarian  involvement when  specific proposals  are  put by the Commission 
on  consumer,  health  and  environmental  issues to a scientific committee.  How to 
improve Parliamentary interaction has therefore been one of the considerations in 
this report. 
2.3.  Industrial confidence. 
Industrial  interaction  at  an  EU  level  - perceived  by  many  as  lobbying  - is  a 
valuable input to the Commission and  certainly sensitises officials to the potential 
impact of decision-making.  When the scientific advisory committees were based in 
DGIII and  DG  VI,  the officials serving the committees had  numerous demands for 
meetings  with  industry  and  were  often  provided  with  industry's  position  papers 
before and  after the scientific meetings.  Only some of these papers  were made 
available to committee members, presumably because officials were protecting the 
committees from undue industrial pressure. 
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independence and  transparency and  the sometimes  extremely valuable technical 
input that industrial groups can  provide to the risk analyses and the implications of 
these assessments in  practice.  A mechanism for gaining the benefits of industrial 
interaction without prejudicing the  independence of the committees has therefore 
been a major issue in the preparation of this report. 
Analyses  of  company  attitudes  suggest  that  the  technologically  innovative  are 
particularly anxious  to  have  a rapid  scheme for assessing  novel  products  which 
need approval.  Industrial pressure and  the needs of Member State governments 
and  the  Commission  to  reveal  themselves  as  welcoming  innovation  led,  for 
example, to the current system for assessing novel foods or novel food  processes 
whereby  90  days  are  allowed  for  the  first  evaluation  of  a  novel  product  with 
subsequent assessments by other Member States having to be dealt with within 60 
days.  Such rules have led to a complete change in management and assessment 
strategies within some Member States but there is still pressure from industrial and 
innovative scientific groups to abolish the need for a third full evaluation by the EU 
itself.  Effort is also being put into a demand that the EU  no longer has the right to 
"stop the clock" during the risk evaluation if a Member State objects to the original 
analysis  of  a  novel  product  by  the  principal  Member  States  involved.  The 
"unnecessary"  duplication  of evaluation  procedures  is  also  cited  as  a distinctive 
disadvantage  of  European  evaluation  schemes  compared  with  the  single  and 
supposedly rapid  procedure held,  for example,  in  the US  by the  Food  and  Drug 
Administration  (FDA).  In  practice  recent  evidence  shows  that  the  FDA take  a 
substantial time to consider many new proposals but the FDA process  is  seen  to 
be much simpler.  For these reasons large multinational companies tend to favour 
the development of a major overarching mechanism for obtaining scientific scrutiny 
and  agreement on  new  products.  Several  industrial  groups  have  also indicated 
that  they  now  feel  somewhat  detached  from  the  scientific  evaluation  process. 
Indeed they consider themselves as often having the most expert understanding of 
scientific issues and the implications of different policy options. 
The  large  multinational  companies  perceive  substantial  advantages  in  the 
development by the  EU  of a single set of standards with which  industry needs  to 
comply throughout the EU.  With appropriate EU  standards,  large companies can 
put  substantial  resources  as  a  single  company  or  on  a  conjoint  basis  into 
maintaining  a  presence  in  Brussels  so  that  they  are  aware  of  new  EU 
developments and can highlight potential problems. 
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find  it  difficult  to  sustain  financial  and  clear  purposeful  support  from  their 
constituent  groups  for  interaction  with  the  Commission  or  with  the  European 
Parliament.  In  some  Member States,  many companies  in  the food  business with 
large turnovers of 50-100 million ECUs have only a very few technical staff.  Most 
food  manufacturing involves  a very large number of small companies:  about 80% 
of food companies in  Europe are so small that they rarely have staff who have the 
time or motivation to understand EU  rules and  regulations or the basis for these in 
the  scientific advice  produced  by expert  committees.  This  implies  that  any  new 
scheme  which  is  proposed  should  consider  mechanisms  for  communicating 
effectively  to  small  companies  as  well  as  to  the  public  in  readily  understood 
language. 
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SCIENTIFIC ADVICE. 
Many  of  the  principles  relating  to  scientific  advice  are  universally  accepted 
whereas  others  have  become  evident  during  the  course  of  our  analyses  and 
hearings: they can  be summarised as follows: 
3.1.  Scientific advice should be: 
•  excellent in quality 
•  independent  of  industrial  and  political  interests,  and  extreme  public  lobby 
groups. 
•  transparent in the manner of its development 
•  realistic  in  terms  of  specifying  the  actual  risks  and  benefits  in  practical 
circumstances 
•  effective in  terms of the coherence of the proposals and  the time taken  to 
come to conclusions 
•  understandable by the Commission, Parliament and Member States but also 
by industry and the public. 
The following principles should also apply: 
•  A  location  in  Brussels  to  ensure  detailed  interaction  with  legislative, 
regulatory,  audit,  policy,  management  and  other  groups  within  many 
Directorates of the Commission. 
•  A powerful involvement with public interest groups. 
•  Direct accountability to elected representatives in the European Parliament. 
•  The need  for the  new  body to  be  sustained  by public funds  since crises 
such as those relating to SSE, beef hormones, dioxin, Coca Cola and GMO 
problems  are  not manageable if the resources  are dependent on  industrial 
funding. 
•  The  capacity  for  playing  a  major  part  in  crisis  management  when  these 
actions are traditionally seen as the responsibility of the Commission as well 
as Member States. 
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States'  scientific  advisory  systems  and  the  Commission,  including  those 
dealing with risk management issues (legislation and controls) 
•  A communication facility which can be linked rapidly to the Commission and 
its new system for the media whilst preserving the option for independence. 
3.2.  The relationship of scientific advice to risk analysis 
The  overall  processes  of  risk  assessment,  risk  management  and  risk 
communication are included in the term risk analysis as shown in  Figure 3.1.  The 
separate identification of the three is extremely valuable.  Our mandate relates to 
risk assessment but as  illustrated  in  Fig.  3.1,  the three components  have to  be 
fundamentally  interactive.  Risk  analysis  has  been  specified  as  those  activities 
needed to protect human health and minimise the incidence of disease through a 
process  of determining  realistic  risk  levels  for the  hazards  involved  and  basing 
policies on the application of results from these analyses. 
In  considering  how  to  improve  the  value  and  effectiveness  of scientific  advice 
these interactions have also been  considered  as  have their relationship with  any 
control  measures  needed  in  public health,  environmental  health  issues and food 
safety.  The value of the four suggested options and  of international systems will 
be  assessed  before  setting  out  the  proposal  for  a more effective evaluation  of 
issues of public health importance in Europe. 
Figure 3.1 
Risk  Analysis 
Risk Assessment  Risk Management 
Produced by Dr. J. Schlundt of WHO during an EU 
Parliamentary hearing, Nov. 1999. 
*Interactive exchange of 
Information and opinions 
concerning risks 
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4.1.  A scientific analysis system within a Directorate General 
This option  has  been  enhanced  by decisions made by Mr.  Prodi  in  July 1999 on 
the reorganisation of the Commission.  Clearly with additional units of relevance to 
health  and  consumer  protection  being  assigned  to  DG  SANCO,  there  is  now  a 
sense that  the  safety and  well-being  of the  Union's  population  is  being  given  a 
higher priority.  This  rearrangement  is  welcome  and  if a reconstituted  system  for 
scientific  advice  continued  within  a  Directorate  General  there  is  no  reason  to 
assign the health and consumer protection groups to another Directorate General 
The new system for scientific advice which  has  developed  in  the last 2 years  has 
much to commend it but the question is whether the scientific assessment scheme 
should  remain  within  a  Directorate  General.  There  are  advantages  in  that  the 
scientific  process  can  be  funded,  supported  and  organised  through  routine 
Commission  mechanisms.  The  present  system  in  effect,  however,  lacks  any 
formally organised  political or public involvement and  its  presence within  a single 
DG means that the scientific committees do not have the ability to demand of other 
Directorate Generals immediate access to data and monitoring systems controlled 
by these other Directorate Generals.  Within the Commission each  DG  is seen  as 
very distinct and  although the EU  has  been  in  existence for only a comparatively 
short time, it has already become rather rigid  in structure, in  its operational lines of 
command  and  in  its  rules  relating  to  process  within  the Commission.  There  are 
routine  interactions  between  DGs  within  the  Commission  but  the  Commission 
processes  are  seen  by  outsiders  as  being  highly  secretive.  Recent  scientific 
analyses reveal that multi-sectoral issues are involved in the analyses of actual risk 
as  distinct from theoretical risk so the processes within  a single DG  automatically 
limit the  expert  scientists' analyses  appropriate to tackling  risk assessment on  a 
proper basis although the Scientific Secretariat may well  be  aware of the broader 
issues.  Although the new Commissioners have signified their desire to both reform 
and  open  up  the  Commission,  the  development of  a modern,  democratic,  open 
system within a DG,  which is  seen to be  relevant to the people of Europe, will  be 
very difficult. 
The  presence of  a scientific  assessment  system  within  DG  SANCO  is  therefore 
seen  as  the  best  option  should  one  have  to  retain  the  system  within  the 
Commission  structure,  but  dramatic  changes  would  be  needed  in  membership, 
transparency,  process and  support.  At present, the membership of committees  is 
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arrangements  is  still  minimal  compared  with  systems  operating  elsewhere.  The 
processing of scientific opinion would also need to be transformed and the support 
system is currently very inadequate for the challenges which lie ahead (see below). 
The ability to take cross-Commission initiatives would  also need to be  developed. 
The lack of relationship to the European  Parliament,  or to elements  of EU's  risk 
management, auditing and communication organisations within the Commission -
all  these issues  lead  to the conclusion  that  it  is  unwise to  continue to  deal  with 
issues  of such  immense  public  concern  simply by  devising  an  improved  system 
within DG SANCO.  This option is therefore rejected. 
For the next three options being considered, some of the principal issues and  how 
they relate to the options are set out in Table 4.1. 
Table 4.1 
A comparison of some possible issues relating to the three principal options 
Independent/autonomous  Interinstitutional office  An Agency analogous to 
Commission Service or  analogous to OLAF  EMEA 
Directorate (in terms of not 
being a component of a 
Directorate General) 
- provides administrative support  - provides administrative support  - provides administrative support 
for the management of the  for the management of the  for the management of the 
scientific Committees composed of  scientific Committees composed of  scientific Committees composed of 
independent members.  independent members  independent members 
Excellence of members  : rules  Excellence of members : rules of  Excellence of members : rules of 
of selection: current  rules can  be  selection: current rules can be  selection : current  rules can be 
implemented (or improved)  implemented (or improved)  implemented (or improved) 
Transparency : current rules of  Transparency : current  rules of  Transparency : current rules of 
transparency (publication of the  transparency (publication of the  transparency (publication of the 
opinions on  internet) can apply or  opinions on internet) can apply or  opinions on internet) can apply or 
be improved if need be.  be improved if need be.  be improved if need be. 
Independence (rules on conflicts  Independence (rules on conflicts  Independence (rules on conflicts 
of interest) : current rules can  of interest) : current rules can  of interest) : current rules can 
apply (or be improved if needed)  apply (or improved if possible)  apply (or improved if possible) 
Staff : scientific, administrative  Staff : scientific, administrative  Staff : Commission rules for staff 
support is provided by the  support is provided by the  but more flexibility (in current 
Commission (Commission  Commission (Commission  practice : permanent Commission 
permanent civil servants,  permanent civil servants,  civil servants for statutory tasks : 
temporary civil servants; "expert  temporary civil servants; "expert  director, head of unit, financial 
national detache"(trained civil  national detache"(trained civil  auditor; temporary staff and local 
servants coming from members  servants coming from members  staff for the others tasks. Private 
States for a 3 years period).  States for a 3 years period). A  contracts are possible for a specific 
Private contracts are possible for a  specific "budget" annex lists the  tasks such as literature researches 
specific tasks such as  literature  post allocated to the office. Private  and special reports. 
researches and special reports.  contracts are possible for a specific 
tasks such as  literature researches 
and special reports. 
Budget : set up along current  Budget : budget entered in a  Budget : independent budget, can 
Commission procedures, i.e.  special budQet headinQ within the  be sustained by fees (fee for 
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Commission Service or  analogous to OLAF  EMEA 
Directorate (in terms of not 
being a component of a 
Directorate General} 
specified within a Directorate  Commission.  commercial application of an 
General during the routine  authorisation  .. ) and subsidies from 
formulation of budgets  Application of fees (fee for  the European Community. 
commercial  application of an  The agency prepares its own 
authorisation  .. ) may be possible.  budget independently. 
Scope for interaction with risk  Scope for interaction with risk  Scope for interaction with risk 
managers (Commission services  managers (Commission services  managers (Commission services 
in charge of drafting legislation):  in charge of drafting legislation):  in charge of drafting legislation): 
Will depend:  Will depend:  Will depend: 
- on the guarantees given to ensure  - on the guarantees given to ensure  - on the guarantees given to ensure 
that the SC are consulted  that the SC are consulted  that the SC are consulted 
- on the scope of competence of  - on the scope of competence of  -on the scope of competence of the 
the independent service or  the independent office (scientific  independent service or directorate 
directorate (scientific advice +  advice + recommendations/follow- (scientific advice + 
recommendations/follow- up of  up of scientific opinions, monitoring  recommendations/follow- up of 
scientific opinions, monitoring of  of risks).  scientific opinions, monitoring of 
risks)  - on the way in which the  risks) 
demarcation risk assessmenUrisk  - on the way in which the 
- on the way in which the  management is defined  demarcation risk assessmenUrisk 
demarcation risk assessmenUnsk  - on the development of a good  management is defined 
management is defined  collaboration relationship with the  - on the development of a good 
- on the development of a good  risk managers  collaborative relationship with the 
collaborative relationship with the  risk managers 
risk managers 
Scope for interaction with  Scope for interaction with  Scope for interaction with 
European Parliament and  European Parliament and  European Parliament and 
Council  Council  Council 
Relationship can be set up between  Well  structured relationship can be  Well structured relationship can be 
parliament and council  set up between parliament and  set up between Parliament and 
representatives and the  council representatives and the  Council representatives and the 
independent service or structure  office.  agency 
but this would not normally be  The Director (Commission official}  Administrative board is constituted 
formally structured.  is appointed by the Commission  in general by a majority of 
after consultation with Council and  representatives of Member States 
Parliament.  (30 in EMEA) Parliament (2 in 
A supervisory Committee is  EMEA) and Commission (2 in 
appointed by common accord of  EMEA). Specific composition rules 
European parliament, the Council  can be set up in  the legal text 
and the Commission.  creating the agency. 
The executive Director 
(Commission official) is appointed 
by the board on the basis of a 
proposal of the Commission. 
Scope for interaction with  Scope for interaction with  Scope for interaction with 
stakeholders  stakeholders  stakeholders 
Specific hearings of stakeholders  Specific hearings of stakeholders  Specific hearings of stakeholders 
by the SC or their WG may be set  by the SC or their WG may be set  by the SC or their W G may be set 
up.  up.  up. 
Communication policy can be  Communication policy can be  Communication policy can be 
established.  established.  established. 
The supervisory committee is  The administrative board may be 
composed of independent outside  composed of some representatives 
persons (which could include  of the stakeholders but it is not the 
stakeholders)  current practice in setting up the 
agencies. 
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Commission Service or  analogous to OLAF  EMEA 
Directorate (in terms of not 
being a component of a 
Directorate General) 
Geographical location  Geographical location  Geographical location 
(operational needs : meeting  (operational needs: meeting  (operational needs: meeting 
infrastructure for around 420  infrastructure for around 420  infrastructure for around 420 
meetings/year, daily meetings with  meetings/year, daily meetings with  meetings/year, daily meetings with 
legislative departments or more in  legislative departments or more in  legislative departments or more in 
case of crisis)  case of crisis)  case of crisis) 
Brussels is in principle the location 
Brussels is in principle the location  for an office  In the current practice, to create a 
for a Commission service  balance between Member States, 
the different agencies have been 
located in each of the MS. Actually, 
Four Member States do not 
currently have an Agency. 
No legal rules demand the 
decentralisation of an Agency to a 
Member State rather than Brussels. 
-------------------
----------------- ---------------- GENERAL 
GENERAL  GENERAL  ----------------
----------------------- -------------- Administrative/political 
Administrative/political  Administrative/political  independence of the structure 
independence of the structure  independence of the structure  An agency has its own legal 
An independent commission  An independent interinstitutional  personality. Therefore it is an 
service or directorate is  under the  office is under the political  independent structure. 
political responsibility of a  responsibility of a Commissioner  The Executive Director is only 
Commissioner. The Parliament  (in the case of OLAF: the  under the supervision of the 
plays a supervision role ( budget,  President). The Parliament plays a  Administrative board composed in 
appointment and censorship of the  supervision role ( budget,  general of a majority of 
Commission) .  appointment and censorship of the  representatives of the Member 
Commission) Furthermore, in the  States. Financial control is 
case of OLAF, the Director shall  performed within the structure. 
neither seek or receive instructions  There is no supervision by 
from any government or institution,  Parliament. 
body or agency in the performance 
of his duties with regard to the 
opening and carrying out of 
investigations or to the drafting of 
reports following such 
investigations. He shall report 
regularly to the EP, Council, the 
Commission and the Court of 
Auditors on the findings of the 
investigations. 
The Supervisory Committee shall 
reinforce the office's independence 
by regular monitoring of the 
investigative function. The 
supervisory committee shall be 
composed of five independent 
outside persons. They shall neither 
seek nor take any instructions from 
any government or any institution, 
body, office or agency. 
Important legal points 
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Independent/autonomous  Interinstitutional office  An Agency analogous to 
Commission Service or  analogous to OLAF  EMEA 
Directorate (in terms of not 
being a component of a 
Directorate General) 
Important legal points  Important legal points  An agency can only be set up on a 
An independent commission  An interinstitutional office follows  legal basis that requires the 
service or directorate follows the  the same legal rules and is entitled  unanimity of the Member States. 
same legal rules and is entitled to  to the same powers and  An agency can never be in charge 
the same powers and guarantees  guarantees as any other  of the legal tasks of the 
as any other Commission services.  Commission services. But a  Commission (to monitor the 
No legal text, apart from a  specific legal text is  needed to  implementation of community law, 
Commission's decision, is needed  create an interinstitutional office in  to propose legislation, to adopt 
to create this independent service  order to ensure its independence  executive measures) 
or directorate.  and to set up the involvement of 
the three institutions (Parliament, 
Council and Commission) 
4.2.  A Commission Service 
In  this  option,  the  principal  difference  from  the  current  procedures  is  that  the 
committees and their support teams would be transferred to an  independent entity 
but continue to be the responsibility of the Commissioner in  charge of Health and 
Consumer Protection.  The Service would operate outside the Directorate General 
system and  have the ability to act and  be seen to act perhaps more independently 
than  is  traditionally the case within  a Directorate general.  The relative  simplicity 
involved in  establishing this mechanism is  set out in  Table 4.1  which compares a 
service with the next two options for change. 
This  commission  service  clearly  would  need,  as  noted  above,  to  develop  very 
different modes  of work from  those currently in  place  but  by  relating  to a single 
Commissioner one  is  inevitably involved  in  the understandable interplay between 
different axes of power within the Commission and  Commissioner system.  One of 
the  principal  concerns  for the  public  is  the evident  sidelining  of issues  of public 
concern when short-term political demands seem to require it or when the financial 
implications are thought- as in the original BSE affair in the UK or,  currently, in the 
rest of the EU - to be too great to be justified on the basis of the supposed risks. 
This then  means  that  one would  need  to  develop a totally different Commission 
service  system  with  different communication,  public  relations,  parliamentary and 
other schemes from those seen in current Commission service systems. There are 
presently  seen  as  very  dependent  on  the  support  of the  particular  responsible 
Commissioner.  The  food,  veterinary,  phytosanitary  environmental  and  public 
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may  be  seen  as  only  a  very  modest  improvement  on  the  current  system. 
Furthermore,  it has two distinct additional  disadvantages.  First it will  be  seen  by 
the  public  as  operating  within  only  one  component  of the  triangular  system  of 
power within Europe, i.e. Commission, Member States and Parliament.  The public, 
therefore, will not see it as operating in  a transparent open manner on their behalf 
because  it  would  not  have  any  direct  relationship  to  them.  A  more  direct 
relationship would  also  be  needed  with  the  Food  Standards  or  Safety Agencies 
and other institutions in  Member States.  The Parliament and media could amplify 
these  concerns,  particularly  when  controversies  arise  during  a food  crisis  (see 
later).  Nevertheless, as indicated in Table 4.1, Parliament could play a supervisory 
role so this second option would be seen as  more appropriate than the first.  The 
service  role  within  one  Commissioner's  system  may  also not  allow the  scientific 
structure  and  process  to  interact  routinely  and  with  the  necessary  power, 
independence and speed with other Commission Services and with Member States 
when the need arises. 
There  is  a clear  need  to  institute  a  new  strategy in  terms  of scientific  support, 
interaction with stakeholders and novel arrangements for new surveillance systems 
relating to public health and the other concerns.  It is therefore likely that adequate 
recognition of these needs  by Member States and  Parliament would  only emerge 
from  a  very  explicit  new  mechanism  of  budgeting  which  would  require  special 
justification. 
It is  concluded that a Commission  Service is  not  an  ideal  scheme for a scientific 
assessment  system  relating  to  such  profound  and  immediate  issues  as  those 
relating  to  public  health.  If,  however,  such  a  structure  is  developed  then  it  is 
considered  essential  to retain  the  reporting  of this  service to the  Commissioner 
responsible for health and consumer protection. 
4.3.  Establishing an Interinstitutional office 
This type of structure is new and has been used to set up the European Anti-fraud 
office (OLAF).  OLAF is  an  Inter-Institutional rather than  a Commission  body and 
specific legal  texts  ensure its  independence and  its  own  power to take initiatives. 
Its main function is the investigation against fraud, corruption in  all the institutions, 
bodies, offices and agencies established by or on the basis of the EC and Euratom 
treaties.  A  Supervisory Committee  is  set  up  to reinforce  OLAF's  independence 
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made up of outside independent persons who are highly qualified and renowned in 
the office's fields of activity. 
Following  an  open  call  for applications, the Director of the Office is  appointed  by 
the Commission, after consultations with the Parliament and Council. 
The  Director  neither  seeks  nor  receives  instructions  from  any  government  or 
institution, body,  office or agency in  the performance of his duties.  He can  open 
and  carry out  any investigation  or  report  in  writing  following  such  investigations. 
He reports  regularly to the EP,  the Council,  the Commission and  to the Court of 
Auditors on the findings of the investigations. 
The  Supervisory  Committee  reinforces  the  office's  independence  by  regular 
monitoring the implementation of OLAF's investigative function.  At the request of 
the Director or on  its own initiative, the Supervisory Committee delivers opinions to 
the Director on  the  activities  of OLAF but without interfering  in  any way with  the 
conduct of specific investigations in progress. 
The Supervisory Committee is composed of five independent outside persons who 
possess the qualifications required for appointment in  their respective countries to 
senior posts  relating  to the office's  areas  of activity.  They are  appointed  by the 
common  accord  of the  European  Parliament,  the  Council  and  the Commission. 
Their term of office is  for 3 years and this term is  renewable once.  They have to 
agree formally to  neither seek nor take  instructions from  any government or any 
institution, body, office or agency in the conduct of their duties. 
The Supervisory Committee appoints its own chairman and adopts its own rules of 
procedure.  Decisions  are taken  on  the  basis  of a majority of its  members  and 
OLAF's  Secretariat  provides  the  support  for  the  work  of  the  Supervisory 
Committee. 
The office has  the responsibility not only to develop the necessary infrastructure 
for its task and  for collecting  and  analysing  information,  but it also has  a special 
training role for bodies with similar duties in Member States.  It has direct access to 
its  immediate investigative and  management I intervention arms,  i.e.  the judiciary 
and  police,  and  represents  the  Commission  in  the  arena  for  which  it  has 
responsibility.  The Director is responsible for generating a preliminary draft budget 
which  goes to the Director-General for Budgets; the office's budget is  separately 
identified in the annual general budget.  As noted in Table 4.1, a close relationship 
is  planned  between  the European  Parliament and  this office, but experience with 
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decision on 28.04.1999. 
Whilst  recognising  that  there  is  as  yet  no  experience  of  this  scheme  working 
effectively  in  practice,  the  Interinstitutional  model  has  most  of  the  features 
specified  as  desirable  for  issues  of immense  public  concern  in  Europe.  It  is  a 
distinct entity with  its  own  public  profile,  it  relates  seemingly appropriately to the 
overall  power structure in  Europe,  it has  independent membership and  has  direct 
access as  of right to immediate investigative and  managemenUintervention arms. 
Its  budget  is  also  specified  separately and  it  is  planned  to  relate  closely to  the 
European Parliament. 
It  is  concluded that this scheme has  many of the features  of an  optimum system 
for dealing  openly with  issues  of  immense  public  concern  and  particularly when 
dealing with  questions which  potentially threaten  political and  industrial concerns. 
It is  important, however, to recognise that the entity relating to fraud is  essentially 
an analytical, rigorous organisation which displays openly the problems rather than 
intervening  in  the  European  management of industrial or public sector practices. 
Its role  is  therefore in  a sense declamatory,  the assumption  being  made that any 
fraud  is  by  definition  unforgivable and  that  public  and  parliamentary opinion  will 
automatically  accept  the  OLAF  findings.  The  issues  relating  to  environmental, 
veterinary,  public health and  other scientific issues are more complex- as  shown 
by the surprising  volte  face  of the media and  many politicians  in  the  UK when  a 
beef-on-the-bone ban was introduced.  Suddenly there was a complete turnaround 
from persisting with  an  absolutely prudent policy of reducing the risk from BSE to 
zero to a perception that the risk profile had  changed and  that it was  legitimate to 
allow  individuals  to  balance  individual  pleasure  against  personal  risk.  These 
problems and uncertainties are likely to escalate.  In the environmental area, there 
are  extremely  complex  issues  with  to  some  public  groups  taking  somewhat 
extreme views.  The confusion  about what constitutes  public health  and  suitable 
policies  to  improve  public  health  in  Europe  have  also  barely  begun  to  be 
considered  by the  EU.  Uncertainties  in  other areas  of scientific analysis,  e.g.  on 
the risks of xenotransplantion,  also exist.  There is therefore a real  dilemma as  to 
how  best  reflect  complex  analyses  and  judgements  in  public  policy  making. 
Therefore there  could  be  a need  to have  a mechanism  analogous  to OLAF  but 
where the outcome of the scientific analyses can  properly be put into perspective 
by  public  enquiries  conducted  by  the  European  Parliament  with  additional 
discussions  and  interactions  with  the  Council.  Again,  an  explicit  transparent 
approach by a manifestly independent body would be of value. 
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environmental  and  other  health  crises  where  daily  decisions  may  become 
necessary on  the  basis  of very uncertain  knowledge  as  in  the recent dioxin  and 
Coca  Cola  affairs.  To handle these  issues,  there is  a clear  need  to develop  a 
different scheme from that currently considered  appropriate for an  OLAF type  of 
organisation.  This is dealt with below. 
4.4.  Establishing an Agency 
As set out in  Table 4.1, this entity in  its  standard mode is very different from that 
needed  in  the  food  and  public  health  areas.  An  agency  is  a  completely 
independent  structure  established  by  the  unanimous  agreement  of  Heads  of 
Member States,  with  an  Agency being  based  in  a Member State.  There are  11 
agencies so some countries do not have an  Agency as  yet.  One such Agency is 
the  European  Agency  for  the  Evaluation  of  Medicinal  Products  (EMEA).  This 
Agency differs substantially from an  Interinstitutional office because it is  run  by a 
Management Board comprised of two representatives of each Member State, with 
only two additional representatives for the Commission and a further two proposed 
by the European Parliament. 
EMEA has acquired a good  reputation and  has expanded  in size to cope with the 
agreed  need  for  the  rapid  as  well  as  effective screening  of new  drugs.  It  has 
developed  with  the  help  of Member States  and  a network of over 2000 experts. 
The Management Board elects its own  chairman and  decisions are adopted  by a 
majority  of  two-thirds  of  the  Board  thereby  allowing  suitable  negotiations  and 
compromises between  Member States.  The Commission originally nominates the 
Executive  Director  but  he  is  then  appointed  by  the  Management  Board  to 
represent legally the Agency and be responsible for its daily management. Experts 
identified  by  Member  States  are  elected  to  serve  for  3  years;  their  term  is 
repeatedly renewable. Member State nominees may be replaced by a deputy and, 
through conjoint action, ensure that the Agency's conclusions are satisfactory from 
their point of view.  EMEA uses a variety of techniques to ensure the development 
of coherent reports within an acceptable time scale. 
The transparency of Agencies  seems  in  general to  have  been  limited.  Thus, for 
example,  EMEA  makes  public  the  membership  and  the  members'  qualifications 
when  serving  on  their  two  committees  dealing  with  either  human  or  veterinary 
medical products.  The public also has access to the declarations of interest of the 
committee membership and there are also EMEA meetings with stakeholders. The 
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work scheme for the Commission,  Member States  and  the European  Parliament. 
Nevertheless  there  is  very  limited  public  health,  media  or  parliamentary 
involvement.  The  EMEA  system  therefore  does  not  have  the  ring  of  public 
transparency  because  only  when  the  final  conclusions  emerge  are  they  made 
public.  In terms of transparency, the contrast with such open  systems as  the US 
FDA is therefore striking 
EMEA's funding  is  relatively independent of the EU  budget since the EU  subsidy 
now amounts to less than a third of the income, the rest coming from fees not only 
for  scrutinising  any  new  veterinary  or  medicinal  products  (1 OOK  and  200K  E 
respectively)  but  also  for  renewing  approval  and  inspections.  Any  company 
involved also has to pay an annual fee of 60,000 E in the medical field and 30,000 
E in  the veterinary  field.  The charges are considered onerous  by the veterinary 
drug industry.  In undertaking its scientific evaluations, the EMEA again has to use 
experts specified by its  Member States.  Thus it may be fair to conclude that this 
particular  Agency  has  detailed  interactions  with  industry,  is  extremely  aware  of 
Member State interests but has only modest interactions with the Commission, the 
European Parliament and public interest groups. 
EMEA's  processes  may  be  very  appropriate  for  pharmacological  assessments 
which  traditionally  relate  to  individual  patient  needs  and  which  involve  the 
balancing of sometimes substantial drug risks with considerable benefit for patients 
who may be  extremely ill.  This approach  is,  however,  totally different in terms  of 
public perception and  in actual risk assessment from that of an  agency involved in 
environmental,  food  and  public  health  issues.  Other  Agencies  were  also 
examined.  Agencies  seem  to  be  considered  as  relatively  divorced  from  major 
decision-making within the Commission and have relatively slow moving processes 
leading to selective action of modest public concern. 
It  was  concluded  that  the  current  Member  State  location  of  Agencies  is 
inappropriate for the new Authority given  the nature of its  work and  the need  for 
extensive interaction,  not only with  visiting  experts,  but with  centrally located  risk 
managers  as  well  as  the Commission,  Council  and  European  Parliament.  Many 
Agencies  seem  divorced  from  immediate,  major  and  politically  contentious 
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environmental  issues.  The  proposed  Authority  should  therefore  be  located  in 
Brussels. 
The conclusion that an Agency system, as currently organised within the EU, is not 
the appropriate structure was  reinforced  by the finding  that Commission  officials 
automatically make assumptions about the nature of an Agency which are totally at 
variance  with  what  is  currently  needed  in  relation  to  food,  public  health  and 
environment in  Europe.  The Agency concept was  therefore rejected  in  favour of 
some of the aspects of the Interinstitutional model (see below). 
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DEALING WITH CONSUMER PROTECTION AND PUBLIC HEALTH. 
Three  organisational  systems  deserve  to  be  considered:  the  UN  system, 
mechanisms such as OECD and national mechanisms. 
5.1.  The UN System 
The huge UN  system  has  had  to develop  a series  of mechanisms to cope with 
scientific evaluations.  Those in consumer protection and public health terms relate 
primarily to WHO and  FAO  which  are also conjointly responsible for the CODEX 
Alimentarius  Commission  (CAC)  first  established  in  1961/62.  WHO  itself  is 
concerned with every aspect of public health and consumer protection in relation to 
health whereas  FAO  has  a major interest in  promoting effective agriculture, food 
production and processing in an appropriate environmental context. 
Both  FAO and WHO depend on  a fairly standard set of procedures in  developing 
their scientific analyses  and  policies.  First,  both  organisations  make substantial 
use of experts selected  by the scientific Secretariats of the UN  agency.  Experts 
produce reports  which may then  be  extensively edited,  expanded  or modified  by 
the recruitment of further experts on  paid contracts.  These reports, which are not 
UN  policy  statements,  are  then  published.  A  second  system  may  then  be 
developed, e.g. by WHO which convenes an  Expert Technical Committee to report 
on a topic of particular importance.  Often working groups are established first and 
expert reports submitted (at little or no cost to WHO because of its financial straits) 
before a single meeting of the final expert committee is held with carefully selected 
regional  delegates.  These delegates  are  proposed  by all  WHO  regions  in  the 
world  and  have  a  special  concern  for  general  consumer  protection  and  public 
health  interests.  A few selected experts  are also designated as  either temporary 
UN  Secretariat staff or as  extra members of the committee which has to produce 
its  report  within  the  4-8  days  allocated.  The  report  is  then  submitted  to  the 
Executive Board  for agreement  before  being  sent by WHO as  an  official  policy 
document to all Member States of WHO. 
The  Codex  system  is  responsible  for  international  harmonisation  of  food 
standards.  The  members  of  Codex  are  the  national  governments.  Different 
intergovernmental  Codex sectoral  committees  (food  additives  and  contaminants, 
hygiene,  veterinary drug  residues,  dietary products  ....  )  prepare the international 
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the governments' members of FAO or WHO are represented. 
The  initial  Codex  proposals  for  international  food  standards  are  based  on  the 
scientific advice of two scientific committees. These scientific Committees are joint 
FAO/WHO  committees:  one  is  responsible  for  safety  assessments  of  food 
additives, contaminants and veterinary drugs residues (JECFA) and the other one 
is  responsible  for  the  safety  assessments  of  Pesticides  (JMPR).  They  are 
independent  committees  which  are  not  considered  intrinsic  components  of the 
CODEX  system  but  advisory  bodies  with  CODEX taking  the  final  decision  for 
managing the risk assessed  by these committees.  Members appointed  to these 
committees are independent experts in their own right. 
Since the Sanitary and  Phytosanitary Agreement (WTO Agreement) provides that 
"Measures,  which  conform  to  international  standards,  shall  be  deemed  to be  in 
accordance  with  the  provision  of the SPS  Agreement and  necessary to protect 
human  health",  there  is  a need  to ensure that the  current arrangements  within 
CODEX and  its  advisory scientific committee system ensure an  independent and 
transparent risk assessment process. 
There is  an  increasing tendency for FAO and WHO to rely on  external funding for 
holding Technical Expert Consultations.  This inevitably means that there is a risk 
of external  influence.  This is  a problem which  is  now being tackled to rectify any 
suggestions of undue influence.  The importance of ensuring transparency of effort 
in the scientific advisory system is also clearly recognised by other well-established 
institutions,  e.g.  the  US  FDA.  Consumer  analyses  of  CODEX  have  recently 
highlighted  the  dominance  of  industrial  - and  particularly  N.  American  and 
European - interests.  Consumer interest groups are  now claiming  therefore that 
the  standards  specified  are  those  conducive  to  free  trade  and  the  benefits  of 
European  and  N.  American  exporters.  WHO CODEX staff are  also publicly on 
record  decrying  the  limited  attendance of Third  World  health  ministries  and  the 
dominance of Western industrial interests. 
FAO and WHO are in fact aware that the credibility of the risk analysis process in 
JECFA  and  JMPR  depends  upon  the  independence  and  competency  of  the 
experts providing scientific advice. They recently recommended to Member States 
that "FAO and  WHO be  encouraged,  with the help of Member states, to expand 
the range of experts who serve on  scientific committees and to consider tightening 
their  conflict  of  interest  requirements"  (FAO/WHO  conference  on  international 
Food trade. Melbourne, Australia 11-15 October 1999). 
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given  the current differences  in  EU  and  US  approaches  to consumer protection. 
The current Commission and  N. American trade disputes often relate to health so 
these are being  referred to the WTO and  subsequently to CODEX for arbitration. 
The Commission  should  recognise that  Europe will  need  to take  account of the 
current arrangements within CODEX and  its advisory committee system if any new 
EU  scientific advisory system is to be effective in terms of WTO disputes. 
5.2.  Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
The  OECD  is  an  organisation  that  provides  governments  a  setting  in  which  to 
discuss,  develop  and  perfect  economic  and  social  policy.  Their exchanges  may 
lead to agreements to act in a formal way,  but more often, their discussion makes 
for better informed work within their own  governments  on  the spectrum of public 
policy and clarifies the impact of national policies on the international community. 
The OECD  is  a club  of 29 developed  countries,  which  produce two thirds of the 
world's goods and  services.  Essentially, membership is  limited only by a country's 
commitment  to  a  market  economy,  a  pluralistic  democracy  and  a  respect  for 
human rights. 
Exchanges  between  OECD  governments'  flow  from  information  and  analysis 
provided  by  a  Secretariat  in  Paris.  Parts  of  the  OECD  Secretariat  (1850  staff) 
collect data,  monitor trends,  analyse and  forecast economic developments, while 
others  research  social  changes  or  evolving  patterns  in  trade,  environment, 
agriculture, technology, taxation and more. 
The  Secretariat  is  directed  by  a  Secretary-General,  assisted  by  four  deputies 
Secretaries-General. The Secretary-General also chairs the Council, providing the 
crucial link between national delegations and the Secretariat. 
Member countries meet and  exchange information in  Committees. The overriding 
committee  is  the  Council,  which  has  the  decision-making  power.  The decisions 
taken in this forum are not binding for the member countries. 
There are about 200 committees, working groups and expert groups. 
The  OECD  main  activities  are  related  to  Economics,  Statistics,  Environment, 
Development,  Public  Management,  Trade,  Enterprises,  Financial  and  Fiscal 
Matters,  Science,  Technology  and  Industry,  Social  Policy,  Agriculture,  Regions, 
Cities and the Countryside, Energy and Working together with non-members. 
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of  safety  related  to  biotechnology  and  the  Directorate  for  Environment  issues 
guidelines for risk assessments of chemicals. 
Increasingly  the  need  for  multidisciplinary  analyses  is  evident  to  OECD  and 
systems of working  on  technical  issues  include the use of recognised  experts  in 
member  countries.  Technical  reviews  from  experts  are  managed  by  the 
Secretariat who themselves adapt and  update reports  in the light of further expert 
analyses.  Controversial topics  may precipitate a supervisory panel  of all  member 
country  representatives  to  call  an  Expert  Meeting.  The  new  system  is,  as 
proposed  later  for  the  EU,  pro-active  with  structured  inputs  from  all  member 
countries  and  with  greater  transparency  than  hitherto.  Programmes  are  also 
becoming broader with individual committees issuing a series of reports each year. 
Analyses of different programmes have led  Committees to conclude that they are 
too slow and  their priority setting  is  insufficiently defined.  Yet OECD's interactive 
process with national networks of experts ensures that realistic analyses are made 
and these eventually lead  to a consensus.  To speed the process,  lead  countries 
and ad-hoc groups may be identified, the feasibility of projects is being determined 
first and  ranking  systems for priority setting  have  been  devised.  The Secretariat 
may  simply  manage  the  procedures  for  consensus  building  or  have  full 
management responsibility when  stakeholders,  e.g.  industry or particular member 
countries  are  seen  to  potentially  prejudice  the  independence  of  the  scientific 
analyses.  There seems,  however,  to  be  little emphasis  on  public involvement in 
these OECD processes. 
5.3.  The Office International des Epizooties (OlE) 
This  is  a world  organisation  for  dealing  with  issues  of animal  health  which  was 
created  in  1924.  It is  sited in  Paris,  France with a mission to inform governments 
of the  occurrence and  course of animal  diseases throughout the world  and  how 
best to control  these diseases.  It  also co-ordinates the international  surveillance 
and  control  of  these  diseases  and  harmonises  regulations  for the trade  in  both 
animals  and  animal  products.  It  meets  at  least  annually  in  an  International 
Committee  which  is  supported  by  an  Administrative  Commission  with  regional 
organisations  in  all  regions  of the world  and  a series  of specialist bodies  which 
deal  with  different  diseases,  health  codes  and  standards.  OlE  also  has 
collaborating  centres,  reference  laboratories  and  working  groups  dealing  with 
different topics of particular importance such a biotechnology.  The organisation is 
seen as a mechanism for facilitating international trade on the basis of agreements 
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therefore, regulations relating to international trade are seen to be the outcome of 
compromises  between  the  scientific  analyses  developed  by working  parties  and 
the practical and political needs of Member States.  There is little or no evidence of 
public scrutiny in either the development of the scientific analyses or in the process 
of compromise by the pre-eminent International Committee. 
5.4.  The United States Food and Drug Administration 
This  is  a  very  large  and  centralised  public  health  agency  which  combines  a 
capacity to  undertake risk assessment,  risk management controls  and  inspection 
throughout the  US,  as  well  as  risk communication.  It is  an  institution  under the 
responsibility of the Secretary of Health within the US Department of Health.  It has 
over  9,000  employees  and  monitors  the  manufacture,  import,  transport,  storage 
and  sale of a huge range of products throughout the U.S.  It can  be sued for its 
judgements and  practice and has the ability to institute legal proceedings.  It has a 
complement of about 2,100 scientists working  in  about 40 laboratories throughout 
the  country.  In  relation  to  drugs  and  novel  foods  and  products,  it  operates  a 
system which allows the Agency to determine what can  be  marketed and  in  what 
form.  It  therefore has  immense  power,  a very large staff and  a broad  range  of 
activities. 
It  is  evident  that  the  three  components  have  helped  to  ensure  the  public's 
appreciation of FDA work.  First it develops  what are seen  to be  exhaustive and 
rigorous  analyses  of the scientific risks to the public.  Secondly,  it  undertakes  its 
work  with  a  remarkable  degree  of  openness  and  legally  binding  transparency 
which is  unmatched in the EU.  Thirdly, the FDA sees itself as operating entirely in 
the interests of the public with the combined tasks of risk evaluation, management 
and  communication within the single entity.  This apparent integration of the three 
components within a single agency is  seen  by  many senior officials as  crucial to 
maintaining the  prestige it has  gained.  The public  knows  exactly which  body  is 
responsible for ensuring  that the  public's  welfare is  safeguarded.  This  image  is 
enhanced by the remarkable response time to a crisis.  Thus clear responsibility for 
coping  with  a crisis  resides  with  designated  senior officials  in  the  FDA and  with 
others in the US Department of Agriculture and Centres for Disease Control.  They 
can  meet within  an  hour and  have explicit responsibility for handling issues which 
may  rapidly  involve  the  Commissioner of the  FDA,  his  senior,  the  Secretary  of 
State for Health and then the President himself. The FDA has the legal capacity to 
shut  down  a  facility  anywhere  in  the  US,  recall  a  product  line  and  take  legal 
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officials  and  with  the  state's  own  core  of  expertise.  The State's  control  covers 
dealing with the inspection and  the validation of proper procedures.  The majority 
of work is therefore state run  but the FDA has overarching control.  In  practice the 
FDA has separate groups dealing with risk assessment, risk management and  risk 
communication  and  recognises  the  value  of  having  different  staff  clearly 
designated for these three areas.  Their interaction is, however, considered crucial 
to ensuring that appropriate perspectives and  effective actions are taken.  Senior 
officials of the FDA consider that their power and  willingness to act to protect the 
public  is  one  of  the  crucial  features  of  reassurance  which  has  led  to  its  high 
standing. 
In the FDA perhaps 90% of the scientific work is done in-house.  It is claimed that 
there  is  such  transparency that  every  meeting  and  memorandum  relating  to  the 
process of analysis and approval is open to public scrutiny.  Only about 10% of the 
FDA's scientific analyses are referred to external committees so the distribution of 
work is  very different from that currently undertaken by the EU.  Nevertheless,  in 
both  modes  of working,  the  level  of scientific support within  the  FDA is  often  at 
least an order of magnitude greater than in the current EU  system. 
The exhaustive nature of many of the US  analyses helps to swing opinion should 
there be  disagreements with  other bodies.  Given  current conflicts  of opinion  on 
several  scientific  issues  between  the  EU  and  the  US  experience  supports  the 
value  of  having  the  sustained  presence  of  high  quality  specialist  scientists  as 
officials associated with the scientific committees. 
There have,  over the last five years,  been  a series of reports which suggest that 
the  FDA  has  been  subjected  to  very  intense  pressure  to  sanction  the  sale  of 
particular new foods  or drugs  despite the disquiet of scientists advising the FDA. 
Such improper influences are difficult to define and the FDA seems to consider its 
policy of remarkable transparency as  a major safeguard.  Nevertheless the FDA's 
procedures, which involve officials and  industrialists agreeing beforehand the type 
and range of studies needed to clear a drug, food or other product, mean that the 
FDA officials could feel obliged to pass the product once the test is completed.  In 
many  European  countries  further  options  and  opinions  may  emerge  during  the 
testing  procedure  which  change  the  balance  of  evidence.  By  not  agreeing 
protocols of assurance beforehand, the  EU  Member State system, therefore,  has 
greater freedom to develop its precautionary approach during the course of further 
industrial testing. 
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Brussels  officials  currently involved  in  scientific assessment  is  minute compared 
with the FDA.  To produce a comparable organisation  in  Europe would therefore 
be  a major undertaking.  It would  require that a number of current organisations, 
e.g.  the  JRC  for  research,  the  FVO  for  the  control  of the  food  and  veterinary 
sectors and other components of the Commission's legal and regulatory arm would 
come  within  the  remit  of  the  Authority  as  well  as  an  appreciable  part  of  the 
research  budget.  This  is  a separate issue from  that dealt with  in  this  report,  but 
whether or not a conjunction of these agencies  and  powers  is  undertaken, there 
will be a need to develop a clearer and more transparent system for the interaction 
of  the  different  components  of  risk  assessment,  risk  management  and  risk 
communication. 
5.5.  Member State procedures 
Within the Member States of the EU  there is  a variety of schemes for assessing 
risk  but  as  in  the  Commission's  system  there  is  an  increasing  emphasis  on  the 
three cardinal principles of excellence, transparency and  independence.  Thus, for 
example,  Denmark,  France,  Ireland  and  the  United  Kingdom  have  recently 
reorganised  their  advisory  and  reporting  systems  to  improve  the  public's 
awareness and acceptance of the processes of risk assessment and structures of 
risk management as  well  as  the control and  auditing of the arrangements.  Some 
Member  States  already  have  well-established  independent  food  agencies,  e.g. 
Sweden, and another Member State,  Finland, has  made unusual arrangements by 
having  developed  a renowned  national  institute of public  health.  It is  clear that 
some  agencies  are  very  separated  from  the  governmental  processes  whereas 
others, e.g.  in  Denmark, are embedded within a government departmental system. 
Some  new  agencies,  e.g.  that  in  France,  have  to  be  consulted  before  the 
government makes a decision but is confined to providing advice, whereas others, 
e.g. that emerging in the UK,  is required to control and ensure the effectiveness of 
general food hygiene rules and animal health inspections whilst operating at an  EU 
level as the negotiating component of UK interests. 
Submissions  by  Member  States  revealed  very  different  systems  for  assessing 
scientific advice with  some states  having  a single committee dealing with a topic, 
e.g. food, whereas other states had much more complex structures. 
Given  the  variety  of  options  being  developed,  which  are  well-known  to  the 
Commission, Member States and European Parliament, the analyses for this report 
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international  and  external  bodies  such  as  CODEX,  OlE  and  the  United  States 
Food and Drug Administration (FDA). 
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At the second parliamentary enquiry into BSE in  December 1998 some Commissioners 
and  European  Parliamentarians  came  out  in  favour  of a  Food  Standards  or  Safety 
Agency for Europe.  Given this background and recent events, it would seem that there 
is a body of opinion supporting the establishment of a more robust organisational entity 
to cope with the challenges and problems set out earlier.  The mandate for the present 
analysis  is,  however,  confined to the scientific assessment of risk so this is  dealt with 
first;  the  broader  picture  and  issues  which  the  Commission  and  Parliament  need  to 
consider come  later.  The views  expressed  here  are  dominated  by the three  agreed 
priorities  of  ensuring  excellence,  independence  and  transparency  in  any  new 
mechanisation of scientific assessment. 
A new entity is  proposed  which  has  many parallels with  the third option,  i.e.  an  inter-
institutional office.  A Brussels-based organisation is  needed which might be called the 
European Food  and  Public Health Authority (EFPHA).  The need to incorporate "food" 
into the title  is  obvious  and,  given  the Amsterdam  Treaty with  its  new emphasis  on 
public health, there is  major benefit in  re-emphasising the  public health  priority of the 
new organisation.  It is  also evident that environmental issues will need to be included 
but to incorporate this into the title makes for a cumbersome name.  Having food Public 
health and environmental issues as linked entities is appropriate since all three require 
unusual  multidimensional  and  multi-sectoral  approaches  if  consumers  are  to  gain 
maximum  benefit.  The  interaction  between  these  three  sectors  is  also  extremely 
important. 
The  term  Authority  is  chosen  because  it  is  distinctive  and  immediately  specifies  a 
different entity from  the  Agency concept which  is  so familiar to Commission  officials 
and Member State policy-makers.  It has also,  in English, the ring of excellence and the 
ability to respond  which  may  be  helpful  given  the  recent  crises.  Its  effectiveness, 
however,  depends  fundamentally  on  its  structure,  relationships,  remit  and  operating 
capacity which is set out below. 
6.1.  Remit 
There are two dimensions to the  issue of remit.  First the  range of issues to  be 
tackled  and  secondly the  extent  to which  a  new  organisation  confines  itself to 
providing scientific assessments. 
It  is  proposed that the fields  covered  by the current 9 committees  established  in 
1997  be  retained  since it has  become  clear that each  of these fields  can  be  of 
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Table  6.1  lists  the  current  committees  and  Appendix  3  vies  their  mandates. 
Experience over the last two years  re-emphasises the need to consider the whole 
food  chain,  public health  in  a new dimension and  a wide range of environmental 
issues. 
Table 6.1 
Scientific Committees currently involved in the DG SANCO system of advice. 
1.  Food 
2.  Animal Nutrition 
3.  Animal Health and Animal Welfare 
4.  Veterinary Measures relating to public health 
5.  Plants 
6.  Cosmetic Products, and Non-food Products intended for Consumers 
7.  Medicinal Products and Medical Devices 
8.  Toxicity, Ecotoxicity and the Environment. 
9.  Overall Scientific Steering Committee dealing with multidisciplinary 
issues, e.g.  BSE. 
6.1.1.  Food 
It would  be surprising if there were not unanimity on the need to include the array 
of complex issues relating to food  in  the Authority's remit with general acceptance 
of the importance of considering the food  chain  in  an  integrated manner,  i.e.  from 
production  to  consumption.  The  need  to  deal  with  issues  ranging  from  the 
challenges of the expanding global food  trade,  the complexities  of novel  infective 
components  and  increasing  technological  opportunities  will  also  present  ever 
increasing  demands  in  the  future.  There  is  therefore  benefit  in  having  a 
multidisciplinary  steering  committee  for  food  with  an  emphasis  which  is  not 
dominated  by classical toxicology and  where  a series  of sectoral committees will 
be needed to deal with the wide range of issues and  to interact with other groups 
dealing with  environmental and  public health  problems.  These aspects are well 
known and will not be detailed. 
6.1.2.  Public Health 
With  the transformation  of the  Commission's  role  in  public  health  a  high  profile 
needs  to  be  given  to  this  important  area  which  has  necessarily  been  a  minor 
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within the competence of the Commission's activities. 
Public health has many dimensions which in a European context require analyses 
in  relation  to the health  impact of actions by other sectors.  Thus the spectrum of 
issues  relating  to  tobacco,  recently  highlighted,  for  example,  by  the  new  WHO 
Director General with proposals for the specific funding of tobacco farmers to allow 
them  to transform their holdings  to other uses,  include the  need  to consider the 
importance  of  passive  smoking,  of  possible  measures  based  on  a  scientific 
understanding of the difficulties of helping reduce the use of cigarettes by teenage 
girls  and  the  validity  of  any  steps  taken  to  reduce  the  nicotine,  tar  or  other 
components  of  tobacco.  There  are  many  other  questions.  To  have  scientific 
analysis on  a European  basis  is  important because currently many policy makers 
simply consider that the answer to tobacco problems is to "educate" the individual 
consumer  not  to  start  smoking.  This  na'ive  approach  is  evident  in  many other 
dimensions of public health, e.g. those relating to inappropriate diets in pregnancy; 
the  substantial  problems  of low  birth  weight  babies;  the  continuing  challenge  of 
iodine  deficiency within  the  EU;  the  widespread  anaemia  in  children  and  adult 
woman;  the  major  issues  relating  to  the  health  of Asians  and  other  immigrant 
communities within the EU;  the challenge of coping with  escalating rates  of adult 
chronic diseases and  the huge and  growing impact of the poor health of Europe's 
elderly.  In societal terms the health impact of societal deprivation, social exclusion 
and  poverty is  now becoming a major European  issue which requires much more 
objective scientific analyses than  are currently available.  Equally important is  the 
profound  significance of the remarkable  decline in  physical  activity induced  by  a 
transformation in  society with  town  planning  and  traffic policies  of some  Member 
States having been  geared predominantly to the private motor car.  City planning, 
building  regulations,  school  and  workplace  policies  have  largely  neglected  the 
importance  of  physical  activity;  current  levels  of  sedentariness  in  children  and 
adults  have  alarming  long-term  health  implications  which  have  as  yet  not  been 
considered.  Similarly dietary factors relating to major public health problems have 
not been considered by the EU's scientific committees before and the analyses are 
made more difficult by  the  paucity of coherent comparable  data  on  diet,  activity 
and the health profile of EU citizens.  This field of public health surveillance should 
be  added  to  the  now  evident  need  for  a  monitoring  system  for  acute  food 
poisoning.  Currently  few  Member  States  have  an  effective  system.  An 
appropriate system developed by Member States in conjunction with the EU would 
then allow a series of appropriate public health analyses to  be developed.  Such a 
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therefore a major need to have a Surveillance Unit or Centre in the new Authority. 
6.1.3.  Environmental issues 
The  recently  established  European  Environmental  Agency  has  concentrated  on 
the important field  of data collection  and  many of the scientific issues  relating  to 
the environment are dealt with within the existing structures of DG  SANCO.  Thus 
water  and  air  quality,  environmental  toxicology,  issues  relating  to  the  potential 
health  impact  of  high  tensions  power  lines  and  the  environmental  aspects  of 
GMOs - these are all  considered.  Given  the numerous  health  implications of so 
many of these issues, it is proposed that the environmental issues continue to be 
addressed  within  the  same  Authority  as  the  public  health  and  food  chain 
assessments.  The  interactive  processes  with  the  Environmental  Agency  and 
between committees will need to be established. 
6. 1.4.  Relating scientific risk assessment to risk management. 
Currently the Scientific Secretariat provides the interface between the independent 
scientific advisory process and  the risk manager.  This  is  a subtle process  that  is 
not restricted to the process of preparing questions and transmitting opinions. The 
essential  dialogue  between  risk  management  and  risk  assessment  continues 
during the Committee meetings. The secretariat plays  a key role  in  ensuring that 
the  dialogue  is  appropriate,  effective  and  productive.  It  is  essential  that  the 
scientific  secretaries  understand  both  the  science  and  the  implications  of  the 
advice for the legislator and  policy maker in  order to ensure articulation  between 
these two components of the risk analysis  process.  Similar requirements exist for 
the  interface  between  risk  assessment and  risk  communication.  This  interfacing 
function is now an integral part of the risk analysis process given the Commission's 
stated  aim  of a functional separation of risk assessment and  risk management.  It 
is, however, a matter of experience that this pure separation is often hard to realise 
in  practice.  Again,  the  Scientific Secretariat  has  an  important  role  in  guiding  the 
process  so  as  to minimise,  if not  exclude,  the  involvement of the  Committees  in 
risk management. 
Practical experience also shows that to  be  effective,  this interface depends  on  a 
close working  relationship  between  the  risk assessor and  risk manager from  the 
beginning of the process when the questions are defined, to the final  stage when 
the  advice  is  translated  into management  proposals.  This  requires  frequent  and 
direct contact with  officials in  the many customer DGs at all  levels.  It is  therefore 
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which demands that it is  physically located with the central administration which  it 
serves in Brussels. 
In  addition to the Commission services, the Secretariat must also be accessible to 
the  other  stakeholders:  petitioners  (a  large  proportion  of the  Committee's  client 
base),  Member  State  officials,  other  submitters  of  information  and  to  special 
interest  groups  that  wish  to  make  their  views  known.  Again,  this  requires  the 
physical  location  of any new structure to  be  central  but the range of interactions 
needs to become more transparent as  in the FDA system. 
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This structure should be developed to support an independent and transparent risk 
assessment process.  The structure is  depicted  in  Figure 7.1  which  sets  out the 
Authority as having an independent Board, analogous in type to the OLAF system. 
However,  it  is  suggested  that  it  has  a membership of 9 with  3 figures  of  major 
international  repute  appointed  by  the  Presidents  of  the  Commission,  of  the 
European Parliament and the Council of Ministers.  A further four members should 
be appointed from individuals proposed by the principal stakeholders, i.e. two from 
the consumer, environmental and public interest groups and two from the industrial 
sector.  It is  important,  however,  that these  individuals,  approved  by  Parliament, 
the  Commission  and  Council  of  Ministers  conduct themselves  as  general  board 
members and not selectively as formal representatives of constituent stakeholders. 
This will  help to  overcome complaints,  for example,  by  one  industrial  group that 
their  "representatives"  have  not  been  chosen  in  preference  to  other 
representatives  proposed  by  farmers,  agricultural  businesses,  co-operatives, 
wholesalers,  distributors,  food  manufacturers,  retailers,  pharmaceutical  groups or 
others.  Finally,  two  further  members  should  be  appointed  by  the  Scientific 
Community  through  the  network  of  the  principal  scientific  organisations  within 
Member States.  It is  suggested that the Authority's Board elects its own chairman 
from  amongst its  members,  instructs the  Director of the Authority,  reports  to the 
three  institutions,  i.e.  the Commission,  Parliament and  Council,  and  ensures  the 
Authority's  Communication  Unit  is  operating  in  line with  the  Board's  policy.  The 
Board should be responsible for the work of the Authority and  should also specify 
that documents from scientific committees are set out appropriately.  It should not, 
however,  have  the  right  to  veto  the  publication  of  a  report  once  the  scientific 
committee  has  considered  and  responded  to  any  general  points  made  by  the 
Board.  The activities of the Board should also be transparent as in the US system 
with freedom of information.  This will be further reassurance that they do not as a 
Board interfere with the Scientific Committees' assessments. 
The Authority's  Director would  best  be  appointed for a five year term  (renewable 
for  a  single  further  term).  The  Commission  should  be  responsible  for  the 
appointment but only after having the agreement of the European Parliament and 
Council of Ministers. The Director is  responsible for the activities of the Authority, 
with executive powers determined by the Board.  The Director should therefore be 
considered as  a high  status  EU  official with  powers  over every component of the 
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or keep secret the deliberations of the Scientific Committees. 
INSTITUTIONS 
Figure 7.1 
EUROPEAN  FOOD  AND  PUBLIC 
HEALTH  AUTHORITY 
Joint Board 
Figure 7.1  illustrates the various components needed within the Authority even  if it 
is  simply to  serve  as  a  major  resource  of  scientific  advice  in  relation  to  policy 
analysis.  Seven  components  are  proposed  but  in  addition  there  is  the  primary 
need for a more substantial Secretariat. 
7  .1.  Scientific Secretariat 
A  fundamental  decision  needs  to  be  made  concerning  the  extent  of  the 
involvement of the  Secretariat in  the development of the opinions.  In  the current 
system, the Secretariat involvement is  low but variable, the external experts doing 
the major part of the work of assembling documents and  reviewing  dossiers prior 
to developing  the final  opinion.  At the other extreme are  systems  used  in  some 
Member States where the Secretariat does the preparatory work (data assembly, 
initial working documents, drafting of opinions etc.) and  the external experts take 
responsibility  for  the  final  conclusions.  The  choice  has  implications  for  the 
independence  (or  the  perceived  independence)  of  scientific  opinions.  In  the 
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on  their  willingness  to  assist  the  Commission.  The  size  of  the  Secretariat  is 
modest in the current system but this is unsatisfactory. 
Practical  considerations  rule  out  an  "unlimited"  full  time  Secretariat.  However, 
experience of the present system suggests that it has  the potential to provide an 
effective scientific infrastructure that could accelerate the handling of dossiers and 
reduce the burden on the experts if properly resourced. 
Currently,  resources  do  not  allow the  Secretariat time to study and  become fully 
involved  in  the details of the  many individual  issues and  dossiers. This limits  the 
managerial effectiveness of the Secretariats and  means  that they cannot always 
play a full  and  satisfying  role  in  the work  of the Committee.  This  may ultimately 
lead  to frustration  and  the loss  of competent officials who can  readily find  other 
posts in the Commission. 
Options for improvement within the likely budgetary constraints of the Commission 
include: 
•  a substantially increase the number of scientific personnel; 
•  making  better  use  of  temporary expertise e.g.  national  experts  serving  as 
temporary officials for up to 3 year periods; 
•  making  better  use  of  the  budget  to  fund  preparatory  work  (as  working 
documents  assembled  with  pertinent  information  by  paid  rapporteurs  or 
literature reviews;  this would  require the proper funding of rapporteurs with 
an  agreed  commitment to manage the  project on  an  in  agreed  time-scale. 
This is an "EMEA  approach"; 
•  hiring of professional scientific writers to draft documents which remain under 
the full responsibility of the committees; 
It is concluded that there is a need for an appropriately sized secretariat for coping 
with the complexity and  range of issues for the scientific analysis.  This need  has 
so  far  been  underestimated  by  the  EU.  Analyses  of  Member  State  and 
international systems suggest that each  major committee needs  at  least 3 highly 
qualified, knowledgeable scientists routinely involved  in  writing  scientific opinions, 
a full-time  administrator  with  full  secretarial  support,  as  well  as  the  back-up  of 
those  required  for  handling  all  the  financial  support  issues.  In  most  national 
arrangements it is the secretariat which produces the drafts and redrafts of position 
papers and  not the individual expert scientists.  Furthermore, analyses undertaken 
by the US  Food  and  Drug Administration show that they have a far greater staff 
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EU. 
There is  a need  for the responsibilities and  duties of the Scientific Secretaries to 
be  defined  and  codified  so  that  their  functions  in  the  Committees  are  clearly 
understood by all those concerned (Member States, experts and other Commission 
officials) 
Responsibilities include: 
•  adherence  to  the  mandate,  time-scale,  principles  of  risk  assessment, 
independence. 
•  ensuring the clarity of the opinion,  consistency of supporting argumentation 
and  the  conclusions,  consistency with  previous  or related  opinions  even  in 
other committees. 
•  reasonable awareness of the underlying legislation or regulatory environment 
where the advice is required and is going to be used 
•  keeping  up  to  date with  developments  in  the area where the committee  is 
developing  the  advice:  attendance  of  conferences,  workshops,  regulatory 
meetings 
They need the authority to intervene when: 
•  Questions  are  delayed  through  organisational  problems  e.g.  rapporteur 
unable  to  deliver  on  agreed  time-scale,  participants  fail  to  deliver agreed 
contributions 
•  Members fail to contribute effectively 
•  Important scientific issues are not addressed fully in the draft opinions 
•  The Secretariat has  an  important role in  the elaboration of the mandates of 
the  questions.  The  Secretariat  needs  to  have  recognised  authority  for 
ensuring  that  questions  are  appropriately  expressed  having  regard  to  the 
mandates  of  the  Committees,  conflicting  policy  objectives  of  Commission 
departments,  the  principles  of  risk  assessment,  practicality  and  any  risk 
assessment  policy  determined  by  the  Commission.  better  use  of  existing 
National resources 
The other components of the administrative structure are as follows: 
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This  unit is  seen  as  a major  component  of the  new Authority with  a direct and 
specific responsibility for engaging with the media, Commission and  Parliament.  It 
would  need  to develop, therefore, a completely different portfolio of presentations 
from  those  in  the  scientific  opinions  as  currently  set  out  on  the  Internet.  The 
scientific  committees  documents  would  still  be  essential  public  documents  but 
there is  a need  to engage the principal stakeholders in  society and  the triangular 
power  base  of  decision-making  within  the  EU  with  a  more  understandable 
synthesis of the work of the committees and its implications.  Thus the significance 
and  weight of evidence emerging  from  the advisory committees  can  be  set  in  a 
proper  perspective.  This  Communications  Unit should  also  be  involved  in  crisis 
management (see section 10). 
7.1.2.  Surveillance Unit 
Currently the surveillance and audit functions of the EU  are divorced from scientific 
analyses which currently have to presuppose that all risk management and control 
systems operate perfectly.  Whilst a proper distinction needs to be made between 
scientific risk assessment, risk management and  the auditing of the effectiveness 
of management schemes the current lack of awareness by scientific committees of 
the  outcome  of  audited  control  systems  means,  as  discussed  earlier,  that  the 
public and  external  policy makers  are  not given  a realistic assessment of risk  by 
the  scientific  committees.  This  audit  function  should  be  allied  to a surveillance 
facility.  It is at present striking that in  DG  SANCO individual experts are somehow 
expected as part of their contribution to be able to collate information from the EU's 
Member  States  as  part  of  any  initial  assessment  of  a  range  of  issues.  The 
scientists often fail to obtain the information in time. 
There  now  needs  to  be  a system  for the  collation  of quality assured  data from 
Member States, many of whom do not have agencies or government departments 
able  to  provide  the  data  in  comparable  form  within  the  time  required. 
Nevertheless,  valuable  data  exist  in  both  the  private  and  public  domains.  There 
therefore  needs  to  be  a resource  and  a Secretariat within  the  new Authority to 
allow these data to b e collected more effectively and  on  a systematic basis.  The 
experience  of  scientific  co-operation  on  the  food  committee  and  the  OECD 
experience suggests that Member States  could  also be  involved  more effectively 
by take responsibility for the EU wide collation of data in a standard format. 
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in  Europe  analogous  to  that  conducted  by  the  CDC  in  Atlanta.  Such  a facility 
should  properly be  linked with  this  unit which  has  responsibility for the  proactive 
collation of data relevant to the work of the Scientific Committees. 
7.1.3.  A Legal/Regulatory Unit 
This  would  serve  as  a link to  policy making:  a large  number of scientific  issues 
arise when lawyers translate complex scientific reports into appropriate regulations. 
Their task would  be  helped  if a unit within the EFPHA contributed to this  process 
and  allowed the scientific advisers to recognise legal  needs.  It is  recognised that 
this  facility already exists within  the  Commission  service,  but at  least part of this 
facility needs to be transferred into the Authority.  Their role is to ensure that the 
multiplicity of legal groups within the Commission are clear about the nature of the 
scientific advice and  its  implications for legal  developments and  at the same time 
to  inform  the  Authority  of  the  outcome  of  the  Commission's  response  to  the 
scientific analyses. 
7. 1.4.  Research Policy Unit 
DG  for  Research  has  responded  to  some  of  the  committee's  analyses  of  SSE 
issues, initiated new research and indeed reorganised funding from the Framework 
V  programme  to  highlight  issues  of  public  concern  in  Europe.  These 
developments are to be commended.  Nevertheless, there is the need to develop a 
formal  system  whereby the  outcome  of all  the  analyses  and  judgements  of the 
scientific committees  include in  the future a specific set of recommendations  for 
tackling the wide range of uncertainties revealed  by the committees' deliberations. 
These should then be fed to a research policy unit within the new Authority with the 
unit having responsibility for ensuring not only direct links to the JRC, but also with 
DG  for  research  such  that  the  research  needs  can  be  prioritised  and  an  overt 
specification of what can  and  cannot be  done is  then  made public as  part of the 
new Authority's  public  communication  portfolio.  This  Research  Policy Unit  may 
also  have  to  undertake  a substantial  amount  of  background  collation,  enquiries 
and analyses  in  its own  right.  Many would then classify the unit as  having its own 
research  portfolio as  well  as  developing a scheme for EU  research  priorities.  It  is 
also recognised  that  if one  took  an  FDA approach to these issues then  the JRC 
would become a component part of the new Authority and DG  Research might well 
be  asked to specify the proportion  of its  budget being  devoted  to reactive  policy 
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committees. 
Whether  or  not  the  Commission  moves  to  a  more  coherent  integration  of  the 
different components  of risk analysis  within  a single Authority will  emerge in  due 
course but from a research point of view it is  evident that the United States' FDA 
considers  itself  as  having  benefited  from  recognising  four  components  to  its 
research needs: 
a)  In-house  research  in  terms  of  improving  technical  testing  or  developing 
practical  research  programmes  with  a 2-3 year time horizon  - as  in  the EU's 
JRC; 
b)  Designating publicly the need for specific research topics to be conducted with 
funds allocated by the organisation to external groups. 
c)  Negotiations  with  the  US  Department  of Agriculture  and  other  agencies  to 
agree  research  priorities.  The Agricultural  and  other departments  then  take 
initiatives  involving  more  strategic  I  basic  research  with  results  of  value 
emerging in perhaps 5-8 years' time. 
d)  Recognition that the States within the US have particular interests, e.g.  in  the 
issues  relating  to fruit growing  in  Florida and  California.  These States  have 
their own budgets which the FDA seeks not to duplicate. 
From this experience  it  is  clear that the research  policy unit in  the new Authority 
could play a novel role by interacting with  Member States so that it becomes clear 
that particular aspects of research are a strength of special research institutions or 
Member States.  These can then be designated as  making a major contribution to 
EU developments. 
7.1.5.  Risk Evaluation Unit 
Such a unit already exists and  is directly attached to the Director General's office. 
This  reflects  the  priority concern  of the  Commission  to  protect consumer health, 
particularly with regard to food safety. 
The  need  to establish  a structure dealing  with  the  highly sensitive  issue of  risk 
evaluation was  identified in  the Communication of the Commission  on  Consumer 
Health  and  Food  Safety of  30  April  1997.  The  need  for  a  network  of  external 
experts in  a broad  variety of specialised areas  has  been  identified with the aim of 
making scientific advice quickly available in emergencies. 
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and  emerging  health  risks;  in  so doing  it  contributes  to a proactive,  rather than 
reactive, approach in dealing with issues related to consumer health. 
The Scientific Committees carry out the  routine  risk-assessments  in  their area  of 
competence such  as  food,  animal feed,  cosmetics etc.  The Risk Evaluation  Unit, 
however,  can  react  rapidly to  immediate  problems  in  order  to  provide  decision-
makers  with  prompt  advice  on  specific  questions.  This  is  the  case  whenever 
safeguard-clauses are provided for in order to limit the risks of food-borne disease 
from  imported  products.  Recently the present Risk Evaluation  Unit contributed to 
assessing the risks arising from the cholera epidemic in Africa and avian  influenza 
in  Hong Kong. 
This  Risk  Evaluation  Unit  also  works  in  close  collaboration  with  the  Scientific 
Committees  on  matters  of particular concern  or major political  interest.  In  1997, 
the composition of the Euro coins needed to be finally agreed, but consumers had 
expressed concern about the nickel content of the alloy to be used for the 1 and 2 
Euro coins,  since in  certain  circumstances  nickel  can  give rise to allergies.  The 
Risk Evaluation Unit was  able rapidly to mobilise the necessary resources to carry 
out laboratory tests on samples of coins. 
This strengthened the position of the Scientific Committee for Toxicity, Ecotoxicity 
and the Environment to assess the risk of nickel allergy in  consumers handling the 
coins,  and  ultimately led  to the public being  reassured.  In  other cases,  the  Unit 
has  been  able  to  perform  extensive  documentary  research  in  support  of  the 
Scientific Committees. 
The EU  has  banned  the import of meat from  hormone-treated animals.  Under a 
recent ruling  by  the World Trade Organisation  (WTO), the  EU  is  now obliged  to 
provide  scientific  justification  for  this  ban.  This  is  an  example  where  both  the 
scientific advisory system  and  a risk evaluation  unit could  be  responsible for the 
co-ordination  of  risk  assessment  on  hormones  which  is  being  carried  out  as  a 
follow-up to the WTO ruling. 
Within a new Authority such a unit would  not only link with the Surveillance Unit, 
but would  be directly involved with a crisis management team and  then feed  back 
to the Scientific Committees the challenges emerging from the crisis. 
7.1.6.  Liaison Unit 
One  of the  principal  challenges  in  the  enlarging  of  the  EU  will  be  how  best  to 
ensure that Member States and  their designated scientific institutions are involved 
Page 52 of 74 effectively  in  the  Authority.  This  is  of  major  importance  and  the  time  involved 
should not be  underestimated.  This function  is  therefore designated as  a liaison 
unit. 
7.1.7.  A Resource Unit 
There will  be  the  need  for a designated  unit to cope with the implications of the 
present  proposals  and  the  demand  for  such  extensive  interactions  in  the 
expanding EU.  Strong administrative support will be needed to fulfil the new tasks 
relating  to  the  management  of  contracts,  staffing,  information  networks, 
documents, equipment, website and  general communication etc.  There will  also 
be the need  to support the expert and  scientific secretariat with  literature search 
facilities  and  expertise,  library,  archiving  and  rapid  retrieval  of  dossiers  and 
documents.  Also  required  is  the collation  of new data emerging  from  the  much 
needed surveillance system in  the expanding  EU.  Much better equipped meeting 
rooms  are  already  needed  with  administrative  support,  electronic  information 
exchange, exposure assessment unit and web-page management etc. 
7.2.  Stakeholder involvement 
Not only should stakeholders be involved in the Board but they should also be able 
to attend  meetings of the Scientific Committee members as  observers.  Whereas 
industrial interests will  be able to attend,  paying for their own  costs,  it is  essential 
that the EU ensure that public interest groups are also able to contribute at least to 
the same extent.  Therefore when  the principal committees  meet,  the EU  should 
agree  to  pay  for  the  attendance  of  consumer,  environmental  and  other  public 
interest  groups  when  their  attendance  would  otherwise  be  prejudiced.  How to 
select  a  representative  of appropriate  groups  will  require  the  development  of  a 
formal  system.  In  addition  to their involvement,  scientific committees  or  at  least 
their  chairs  with  1  or  2  expert  members,  should  in  the  future  take  part  in 
systematically  ensuring  that  the  stakeholders  are  fully  in  the  picture  before  a 
mandate is agreed,  i.e.  before a problem is tackled and  again when  an  opinion is 
being  reached.  Different forms  of hearing  and  debriefing  procedures  should  be 
tried to see which prove most effective.  The need, however, for these meetings to 
improve the transparency of the process should not be in doubt. 
A  system  of observers  is  proposed  where,  as  in  the  current  scientific  selection 
process, the individual stakeholder would be proposed for selection.  The selection 
process  would  identify  the  person  with  the  most  appropriate  background  for 
service  on  the  committee.  Again,  therefore,  the chosen  would  be  there  on  an 
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already worked well  in  some Member States and  is  expanding.  The Commission 
should learn from this experience. 
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8.1.  Mandates 
The competencies of the scientific advisory committees should clearly encompass 
those currently involving DG  SANCO and be extended as  indicated above to cope 
with  the  new  portfolio  of  DG  SANCO's  responsibilities.  The  mandates  of  the 
steering  committees  need  to  be  broad  and  explicitly  allow  the  committees  to 
indicate  a  new  analysis  which  they  perceive  to  be  of  emerging  concern.  This 
approach,  unlike  that  seen  in  several  national  systems,  has  already  proven 
beneficial in the new working format for the current Scientific Steering Committee . 
The ability to initiate enquiries should therefore be a consistent feature of all three 
major multidisciplinary scientific steering committees in the future. 
A further principle needed  is  one where the scientific committees  help formulate 
the mandate for their specific work.  Mandates have on occasion been  proposed-
in  practice at  the  request of other Directorate Generals - which  not  only set the 
confines of the agenda but in  practice prejudice the outcome of the analysis.  This 
will  be avoided if one of the tasks of the committee is to discuss and develop the 
mandate  for  their  task  in  conjunction  with  the  Commission  and  after  involving 
stakeholders as already specified. 
Thus the new approach needed to risk assessment in  public health analyses (see 
Section  6.1.2)  means  that great benefit can  emerge from  ensuring that  in  each 
dimension  of  analysis  a  coherent  system  is  developed  which  attempts  to  be 
consistent so that the Communications  Unit can  develop a new approach to the 
different sections to which it relates. 
8.2.  Options for initiating scientific review 
The experience of the last two years illustrates the benefit of scientific committees 
having  the option  of initiating  a review  on  a topic  which  they consider to  be  of 
emerging importance.  It is  important to continue to support the policy whereby a 
scientific committees has the right to review an area.  Clearly the committees need 
to be able to respond to requests from the different DGs of the Commission but the 
proposed  new  arrangements  will  create  a  new  opportunity  for  the  European 
Parliament to be provided with additional analyses and  policy options.  A need for 
further work may also arise as a result of discussions by the Council of Ministers. 
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develop systems for both  prioritising  requests  and  considering  how best to cope 
with complex questions which include political or other components which go well 
beyond  the  mandates  of  the  collective  range  of  scientific  committee 
responsibilities.  The Board should  be the final arbiter of how to respond to these 
novel demands. 
8.3.  Number, composition and structure of scientific committees 
With  the  exception  of  the  Scientific  Steering  Committee,  the  current  committee 
structures continue to  reflect the  legislative  structures that the Committees  were 
originally established  to  serve.  Whilst continuing  to  providing  a sound  basis  for 
ensuring  that  the  advice  is  relevant  to  the  corresponding  legislative  and  policy 
sector,  a structure based  on  technical  rationales  can  also be  envisaged.  e.g.  by 
scientific discipline  (toxicology, molecular genetics, microbiology and hygiene  .. ) or 
even by broad generic area (e.g. public health and environment). 
Whilst admitting the attraction of ensuring scientific coherence, such arrangements 
run  the risk of creating  bottle necks  and  delays  because a very large number of 
questions would need to be examined by a series of Committees and, there would 
still  remain  the  requirement  to  meld  the  individual  parts  into  a  single  coherent 
opinion.  Such  "multi-committee"  approaches  would  also  conflict  with  certain 
formalised  procedures  as  typified  by  the  Novel  Foods  regulation  that  requires 
consultation of a specific committee.  Generally, the present system has proven  its 
ability  to  serve  the  needs  of  its  primary  customers  (the  legislating  and  policy 
making DGs). Any new system should be at least as effective as the present one. 
As  illustrated  in  Fig.  7.1,  three  general  overarching  steering  committees  are 
proposed,  i.e.  those dealing with the food  chain,  environmental  and  public health 
issues.  Within  this  committee  structure,  there  will  be  a  full  complement  of 
committees  which  deal  with  particular  areas  of responsibility.  On  the  basis  of 
current experience there may be more than a 100 opinions/analyses continuing to 
be produced by these groups each year.  To ensure that these reports are set out 
clearly,  are  also compatible with  each  other as  well  as  contributing  effectively to 
policy-making is a remarkable challenge for the Scientific Secretariat as well as for 
the overarching Steering Committees. 
Given the major restructuring of committees in the last 2 years,  it is concluded that 
for the  present there  should  be  no further major changes  with  the following  two 
exceptions: 
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other TSEs.  This is  inevitable given the dimensions of the public health crisis 
of the last 3 years.  Nevertheless,  this  activity might logically be  considered 
within  the  context of a communicable disease committee which  also copes 
with  such  emerging  problems  as  E.  coli  0157  and  other similar food  borne 
diseases  which  have  major  implications  for environmental,  agricultural  and 
food processing concerns. 
b)  The  principal  public  health  problems  of  Europe  need  to  be  handled  by  a 
strategic  committee  with  a  clear  perception  of  public  health.  Given  its 
intersectoral  nature,  this  would  have  a format  and  perhaps  operating  style 
analogous  to  that  now  used  in  the  Scientific  Steering  Committee.  This 
proposal  is  based  on  the assumption that no new institution for this specific 
purpose is likely to be developed. 
The overall  portfolio of committee mandates  is  wide  and  in  consumer protection 
and  health terms is  likely to broaden.  Thus the new Authority's remit means that 
its interests and analyses will impact on several DGs' work. 
The one area which requires particular consideration relates to public health which, 
following  the  Amsterdam  Treaty,  now  acquires  a  new  prominence  in  European 
affairs.  Several  Member States  have  a strong tradition  in  public health  analyses 
and actions, e.g. Scandinavia, whereas others have a poor understanding of these 
issues.  With the EU's enlargement, there needs to be a new emphasis on  public 
health  because  there  is  a very  large  number of  structural  factors  which  have  a 
major impact on  consumer health  and  well-being,  e.g.  water,  sanitation,  housing, 
industry,  transport,  local  planning  and  other  environmental  policies  which  have 
received too little attention in relation to health.  In this preliminary report the issue 
is  simply highlighted and should be developed  in  greater depth by a public health 
committee. 
8.4.  Selection of experts and the Secretariat 
8.4. 1.  Selection of  experts 
The  new  arrangements  whereby  experts  are  recruited  as  candidates  for  the 
principal  committees  by  responding  to  a  public  invitation  is  an  important  step 
forward in ensuring that the process is transparent and that individual experts have 
the chance of being  considered.  It is  proposed that there should  be  a public call 
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stakeholders. 
There are six areas in the current system which could be improved: 
•:•  To  enhance  transparency  and  to  ensure  that  stakeholders  are  able  to 
contribute  to  the  overall  development  of  the  portfolio  of  expertise, 
representatives  from  the  Stakeholder  groups  listed  in  Section  7  should  be 
invited to comment on the development of the portfolios of expertise for each 
committee's  mandate.  They could  also be  considered  as  observers  of the 
appointment system. 
•!•  World class  European scientists are unlikely to put themselves forward  given 
the  intense  demands  on  their  time  and  the  likelihood  that  they  would  be 
unaware  of the  current method  of  advertising.  The experience of the  US 
FDA may be relevant since they overcame the difficulty by contracting experts 
for specific tasks or agreeing, for example, a day/week contract for a year at a 
pro  rata  cost  of  $60-100,000  per  year  with  higher  fees  for  exceptional 
scientists with unrivalled knowledge or experience. 
•:•  A  proportion  of  scientists  with  excellent  academic  records  prove  unable  to 
operate in  an  interactive environment where eventual consensus is desirable 
rather than  the  demonstration  of  individual  pre-eminence.  This  implies  the 
need to include external enquiry of potential candidates and a new system of 
appointment with a one year temporary appointment prior to the provision of a 
full  contract for attendance at  meetings.  An  option  for a probation  system 
where  inappropriate  scientists  can  be  removed  earlier  is  an  alternative 
preliminary  scheme.  Care  needs  to  be  taken,  however,  in  ensuring  the 
continued presence of scientists with  different views.  A new transparency in 
procedure  will  help  to  safeguard  these  scientists.  Alternatively,  potentially 
suitable scientists can  be  invited to join a working group, thereby allowing  a 
preliminary evaluation of his/her contribution. 
•:•  Some appointed  scientists, once recruited,  in  practice rarely attend  meetings 
and/or rarely undertake personal responsibility for contributing with additional 
input to the committees.  The ability to remove such appointed experts would 
be covered by a probation system but again needs to be transparent. 
•:•  The  balance  of  expertise  within  the  principal  committees  has  sometimes 
proved to be inappropriate; that suggests the need for a clearer specification 
of the range of expertise needed when handling a committee's mandate.  The 
Page 58 of 74 breadth of expertise would also be helped by having stakeholder suggestions 
but the specification of what exactly is required from an  expert committee is a 
task which needs very clear thinking and specification as  recently highlighted 
by the Office of Science and Technology in the UK. 
•:•  The present appointment process involves recruiting the whole committee for 
a 3 year period.  It would  be  preferable to develop a system of rotating  but 
renewable  appointments  so  that  the  corporate  understanding  of  the 
committee  can  be  retained  with  the option  for  both  adjusting  expertise and 
introducing fresh thinking at yearly intervals. 
These proposals for change imply the need for a more flexible recruitment system 
with the development of a standardised annual procedure which becomes a simple 
routine organised  by the Secretariat but  supervised  by the EFPHA's Board.  The 
need  of  specific  procedures  to  ensure  that  the  criteria  for  excellence, 
independence and transparency are fulfilled will still exist. 
As  indicated above,  external experts should  now be  drawn from anywhere in  the 
world  if the expert identified in,  for example,  Japan, Australasia or North America 
has a unique and  important contribution to make to the Authority's analyses.  The 
difficulty in  recruiting world  class experts to the often tedious  process of scientific 
analysis  and  its  policy implications  is  amplified  if experts  live  outside Europe.  A 
mechanism  is  therefore  needed  to  involve  selected  experts.  One  option  is  to 
provide them  with  a contract to  produce a preliminary report.  The issues which 
then  need  to  be  addressed  could  then  be  explicitly developed  by  the  relevant 
EFPHA committee and  its  Secretariat to limit the time and  travelling demands on 
the expert. 
8.4.2.  Links with other relevant institutions and groups. 
The  experience  of  the  last  two  years  has  clearly  demonstrated  the  value  of 
interacting with  other international  institutions  and  groups  involved  in  a particular 
field of endeavour.  The policy for scientific interaction at a scientific working group 
level  should  therefore  be  reinforced  in  the  future.  Where  there  are  particular 
concerns there is  benefit in  ensuring that those groups with the greatest expertise 
or  established  views  are  recognised  and  that  they  are  allowed  to  provide 
information and  potentially a representative for a special hearing of their concern. 
Care  needs  to  be  taken  to  ensure  that  the  external  groups  are  not  allowed  to 
highjack or pre-empt proceedings but in general the more open and interactive the 
process the better. 
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The  current  system  of  appointment  developed  with  the  heavy  involvement  of 
Commission  officials  from  several  DGs.  It  was  clear  that  some  officials  were 
particularly anxious to promote scientists with whom they had worked well whereas 
others  were  anxious  to  reduce  the  dominance  of  scientists  from  2-3  Member 
States  where  there  seems  to  be  particular  expertise.  After  the  first  phase  of 
selection  and  another  round  where  some  scientists  had  been  chosen  for  2-3 
committees,  the  Commission  had  the  responsibility  for  finalising  the  choice  of 
expert. The geographical distribution of the chosen scientists was then considered. 
From a scientific point of view, it is easy to specify that the ideal selection system is 
one which selects the  best expertise irrespective of their national origin.  Clearly, 
however,  the  practicalities  of  handling  contentious  issues  of  intense  political 
concern  are  helped  if  there  is  a  good  geographical  spread  of  scientists  on 
committees.  With the enlargement of the EU  this will become a more contentious 
issue.  It is suggested that, to handle this problem, the new Authority, as  part of a 
new  relationship  with  Member  States  Agencies,  sets  out  to  encourage  best 
practice in  handling scientific expertise and  in  effect becomes a training facility for 
those Member States with little experience in handling policy issues relating to food 
standards,  public  health  and  environmental  concerns.  In  this  way the Authority 
draws on and enhances the best practice of some Member States and nurtures the 
development of the type  of expertise which  some major countries  within  the  EU 
find  hard  to  identify  within  their  country  despite  having  outstanding  laboratory 
scientists and doctors. 
8.4.4.  Selection of  Secretariat 
In  Section 7.1  it is  proposed that the scientific secretariat is enlarged to provide 
the degree of support currently enjoyed  by similar national  expert committees. 
The scientific  secretariat  needs  ideally a scientific  background  in  the  general 
area covered  by an  EFPHA committee, the ability to draft documents at speed, 
good  management skills  and  good  communication  skills.  To find  such  highly 
qualified  individuals  is  not  easy  but  three  sources  should  be  considered:  a) 
Commission  staff;  b)  short-term,  e.g.  for  3  year  or  so  secondments  from 
National  Ministries  and  c)  new  temporary  as  well  permanent  recruits  from 
Universities  and  other  academic  centres  within  the  EU.  The  value  of 
secondments to the EFPHA for both the EU  and  the Member States should be 
recognised: special efforts should be made to provide experience of the EFPHA 
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for staff from the  smaller nations,  e.g.  those <10  million.  Particular emphasis 
should also now be placed on  recruiting temporary staff from nations expected 
to become part of the expanded  EU  within the next five years.  Other nations 
expected to come close to membership within the next 10 years should also be 
targeted  so  that  there  can  be  an  appropriate  interaction  between  the 
Commission and Member State scientific staff on a long-term basis. 
Although the construction of a multi-layered  bureaucracy brings  organisational 
problems,  there is  a clear need  for an  additional forum that brings together all 
the  stakeholders:  scientists,  legislators,  EP,  member  states,  consumers, 
industry etc. The UK's Food Advisory Committee (FAC) may provide inspiration 
for such a forum.  It should  be distinct from the science based  risk assessment 
work of the "scientific council".  The French Conseil National de !'Alimentation is 
another example of stakeholder involvement. 
8.5.  The  process  of scientific  evaluation  taking  account  of Member State 
and international interests. 
A  series  of  approaches  to  scientific  evaluation  has  been  evolving  as  different 
committees  respond  to  the  need  to  combine  exceptionally detailed  analyses  of 
complex  problems  in  fields  where  scientific  progress  may  be  rapid  with  an 
integrated  multidimensional  perspective  based  on  having  to  present conclusions 
and  policy  options  on  the  basis  of  great  uncertainty  and  limited  scientific 
understanding.  These include the complex issues relating to BSE,  issues relating 
to GMOs and the basis for the development of antibiotic resistance.  In 2 of these 
areas up to 3 different layers of analysis have emerged:-
a)  Focused and  often  basic analyses of a problem  undertaken  by a group of 
specially convened  experts  from  one  or  two  disciplines.  Sometimes  this 
involves  the  commissioning  of  a  report  by  a  single  expert  or  European 
institute. 
b)  The combination of a group of reports or inputs from a variety of disciplines 
into  a  single  overview  which  often  displays  the  very  large  number  of 
unanswered  questions  which  emerge  particularly when  attempting  to  link 
work from  different fields.  This evaluation thus emerges  as  a background 
document or working group paper. 
c)  A final  integrated opinion from  a supervisory general  committee  made up 
of  scientists  from  many  disciplines  who  have  to  recognise  the  many 
dimensions of the problem and  weight the analyses to provide a balanced 
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as  a  separate  opinion  but  published  in  conjunction  with  the  working 
background paper.  This approach should be retained in the new system.  It 
also  provides  opportunities  for  widespread  geographical  input  and  for 
scientists to learn the skills of risk assessment. 
8.5.1.  Member State interests 
Experience  has  shown  that  there  is  great  benefit  in  having  different national 
perspectives,  particularly  when  considering  risk  assessments  and  the  policy 
implications  which  can  have  a  very  different  impact  on  the  very  different 
environmental,  social  and  cultural  contexts  of  Member States.  However,  two 
principal issues have emerged: 
a)  There is  not  enough  interaction with the expertise and  analyses  available 
within national governments of Member States.  A new system needs to be 
devised to facilitate the rapid  exchange of views.  This exchange needs to 
be  recognised  as  mutually  beneficial:  the  EFPHA's  scientific  committees 
can  take  account  of  regional  or  national  issues  as  well  as  of  additional 
expertise.  The Member States also benefit because their expertise as well 
as  any unusual  national  issue will  have contributed to the  integrated  view 
and  often  reveal  a  new  agricultural,  environmental  or  policy  dimension 
previously  unrecognised  by  the  EU  committee.  This  need  is  likely  to 
increase markedly with the impending EU  expansion of the EU  into Central 
Europe. 
b)  Some  Member  States'  industrialists  and  scientists  perceive  that  there  is 
substantial  duplication  of  effort  with  some  Member  States  having 
exceptional expertise in a particular area.  This recognition in  part underlies 
some of the current EU policies on subsidiarity as displayed, for example, in 
the  procedures  for  assessing  novel  foods  or  GMOs  where  a  national  or 
international company can  submit their application to any Member State of 
their choosing.  The Member State's opinion then becomes the EU  opinion 
if no other national objections are raised. 
In  practice, many issues are emerging as  contentious, e.g.  novel foods, functional 
foods, GMOs, the response to BSE and Member States may object to the opinions 
generated.  This then  requires  the Commission to request  an  adjudication  by  its 
own  committee.  It has  been argued that this system is exceptionally cumbersome, 
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Committees of Member States' officials for approval. 
Clearly,  as  the  EU  expands,  it  is  increasingly  unlikely that  all  Member  States, 
particularly small  countries with  limited scientific personnel,  will  have the depth  of 
expertise  necessary  to  underta'ke  a  thorough  and  wideranging  review  which 
incorporates an understanding of all the issues at stake across the whole EU.  This 
inevitably leads to the likelihood that large Member States with a substantial depth 
and breadth of scientific expertise will be increasingly used in any devolved system 
for handling  risk analyses.  The EFPHA's  committees  are  also likely to prove  of 
increasing importance. 
Rather than seeing these developments as competitive alternatives, it is suggested 
that there should  be greater interaction of Member State advisory groups with the 
EFPHA system. Three improvements are proposed: 
•  A routine request at  the start of any evaluation  for Member States to  provide 
whatever input they consider would be useful for EFPHA scientific analyses. 
•  The nomination  by EFPHA committees  of particular expert groups or advisory 
bodies within Member States to undertake specific studies. 
•  The involvement of specific government scientists with particular expertise from 
Member States in  EFPHA expert groups whenever possible.  This should not be 
seen  as  a proposal to develop a political balance by having all  Member States 
represented - the choice should  be  based  on  a few individuals with  particular 
experience. 
8.5.2.  International interests. 
It is  becoming  clear that the  Commission's  scientific committees  work and  the 
impact of their reports  are  more effective if there  is  international  involvement. 
This  is  particularly true  when  issues  arise  which  have  major  implications  for 
specific countries.  Thus this year's  analyses  of the geographical  BSE risks  in 
different countries has  benefited greatly from non-EU  involvement.  Not only is 
there  additional  scientific  input,  but  when  the  non-EU  experts  come  from 
governmental  positions,  their  involvement  in  complex  analyses  and  decision-
making  has  allowed  them to have  a much  better insight into the  basis for the 
EU's scientific analysis.  It is therefore suggested that the EU take a much more 
pro-active approach  to the  involvement  of international  experts  and  scientists 
from  government departments,  particularly when  a country is  likely to  have  a 
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current system where, for example, 4 American scientists were members of the 
working group on  hormones".  This procedure should be encouraged. 
It is  also now becoming clear that the Commission's  scientific committees and 
those  involved  in  the  analyses  conducted  by  the  US  Food  and  Drug 
Administration  are  taking  very  different  perspectives,  e.g.  when  considering 
GMOs, the animal  and  human risks from the use of bovine somatotrophin  and 
the risks of hormone use in beef rearing.  This is leading to major trade disputes 
and  charges from  both  EU  and  American scientists and  policy-makers that the 
other's analyses are determined by industrial or political interests.  Certainly US 
opinion  has  not yet  recognised  the last 2 years'  changes  in  EU  arrangements 
for  scientific  procedures  and  analyses.  The  recent  proposals  in  US-
Commission  negotiations*  to  have  conjoint  analyses  with  both  EU  and  US 
scientists is therefore welcome. 
Emerging  from  these developments  is  the  need  for the  EFPHA to develop  a 
very pro-active set of procedures which anticipate potential difficulties in  coping 
with  different international  perspectives  on  the  food  chain,  environmental  and 
public health issues.  So far only benefit has  come from involving stakeholders 
in  these  deliberations  but  care  is  needed  to  safeguard  the  independence  of 
scientific analyses. 
8.6.  Transparency of scientific analyses and their outcome. 
There  is  a  need  to  continue  to  develop  a transparent  approach  to  the  EU's 
scientific analyses.  The stakeholders as well as the European Parliament need 
to  recognise  that  the  committees  of  DG  SANCO  have  been  shielded  from 
industrial  and  political  pressures.  So there  is  benefit if this  policy decision  is 
clearly  set  out  by  DG  SANCO  in  its  presentation  of  the  new  system.  The 
transparency  of  the  process  could  be  increased  however.  There  is  merit  in 
allowing the stakeholders the opportunity to highlight issues of concern before a 
committee  is  fully  embarked  on  its  analysis.  Furthermore,  there  would  be 
benefit  in  having  a  designated  qualified  representative  of  stakeholder  group 
serving  as  an  observer on  the  main  committees.  It would  seem  important to 
have single, specified observers designated with no substitution option and with 
the recognition  that preliminary discussions in  committee are  likely to continue 
* Bonn declaration 
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over  a large  range  of  options  without  having  particular proposals  ascribed  to 
them.  Stakeholders could become involved in  proceedings but this would need 
careful monitoring and  control by the committee chairs.  The earlier request by 
EU  parliamentary  committees  to  be  allowed  to  take  part  in  these  principal 
committees  might  best  be  handled  by  having  the  Parliamentary  committee 
designate  one  of  its  expert  secretariat  staff  to  serve  in  this  capacity.  The 
exhaustive analyses  and  redrafting of reports - which  has  sometimes required 
up to 30 drafts or more in  recent experience - is not an  environment conducive 
to the busy parliamentarian  or those who simply seek a particular outcome to 
the scientific analysis and wish to come only for the final approval process. 
Currently the  outcome of  committee  meetings  and  the  reports  are  placed  as 
rapidly as  possible  on  the  internet.  This  should  continue  but  the  practice of 
putting a draft of the report out for consultation is,  in  general,  a good  idea and 
should be done more frequently than at  present.  Furthermore, the proposal to 
have a communications  unit incorporated  into the new authority will  provide a 
more effective opportunity for communicating with the public.  The stakeholder 
representative in the committees should also have the responsibility for alerting 
their  constituent  bodies  to  developments  and  new  analyses  once  these  are 
agreed by the committees. 
Particular attention will  need to be given to the European Parliament which has 
in the last 2 years held two major sessions in  Brussels involving >500 people in 
public  meetings  dealing  with  the  handling  of  BSE  and  its  aftermath.  It  is 
expected  that  future  parliamentary committee  will  hold  regular  meetings  into 
consumer protection  and  public  health  so the  proposed  new  Authority would 
need  to develop  mechanisms  to  ensure that Chairman,  selected  experts  and 
the scientific Secretariat become accustomed to handling these opportunities to 
explain their work. 
8.7.  Remuneration and maintaining the best European advice 
Top quality scientific advice is  a 'marketable service' obeying  to some extent the 
rules of the market, i.e.  if the Commission wants top notch scientists to be vying to 
become members of its scientific committees  it needs to pay them at  least at par 
with other 'customers'. 
Current procedures for reimbursing experts expenses has changed recently but, as 
widely  recognised,  the  procedures  continue  to  handicap  the  Commission's 
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coming  to  see  the  helping  of  the  Commission  as  a  low  priority  because  their 
standing  in  academia  and  their  local  institution  increasingly  depends  on  the 
capacity of scientific leaders  to win  major contracts  through  competitive tenders. 
Their personal  contracts  and  remuneration  are  increasingly being  determined  by 
their track record  as  scientists who conduct effective research  and  produce very 
high  quality  papers  in  the  best  journals.  The  pressure  on  scientists  and 
universities  to  maintain  a  cadre  of  junior and  support  staff has  increased  very 
substantially in  the last 5 years  so a request from the Commission for immediate 
and  perhaps  prolonged  help  is  seen  not  only as  cavalier,  but  insensitive to  the 
realities  of modern  academia.  It  is  therefore  likely that  it  will  prove  increasingly 
difficult to recruit top flight scientists to undertake the Commission's work. 
In  terms  of reimbursement,  there  are  several  further developments  whereby the 
Commission could improve its reputation but these are not dealt with here because 
the  major  issue  is  how  to  cope  with  the  new  circumstances  of  scientists  being 
forced to consider themselves operating in a consultancy mode. 
There  are  three  options  which  should  be  tried.  First the  EU  could  reserve  the 
major  scientists  and  his/her  group  for  specific  contracts  to  produce  substantive 
reports of importance for scientific committee.  These contracts can  then  be seen 
to  limit  the  time  involved  in  Brussels  and  be  in  keeping  with  modern  research 
practice.  Secondly  the  Commission  could  undertake  to  pay  the  scientists' 
institution  the  equivalent  of  his  salary  and  personal  overheads  for  the  time 
contributed  to  the  Commission's  business.  This  is  the  practice  in  some 
organisations and  needs careful  handling by administrative staff who are used to 
negotiating this type of contract.  This then allows the scientist to recruit a junior 
member of staff to promote his research while in Brussels.  Thirdly, an option could 
be  considered for selectively recruiting  for a year or more  a senior member of  a 
scientist's team  to serve as  a special expert to a particular committee involved  in 
reviewing  an  area.  This third  option  may prove  harder to enact because of the 
disruption of the scientist's life by a temporary transfer to Brussels. 
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The EU  needs  to develop further its approach  to crisis management.  A  unit or 
group  is  needed  to  enhance  the  importance  of  the  recently  developed  risk 
evaluation unit.  Experience in Member States and the US demonstrates the need 
for professional training on  how to manage and  be seen to manage crises.  The 
proposal  to  incorporate a risk  evaluation  unit  into the Authority is  made  on  the 
basis  of its  role  being  that  of a  rapid  response  unit which  in  effect  has  to  be 
completely  aware  of  the  detailed  work  already  undertaken  by  scientific 
committees. Immediate and effective interaction by a crisis management unit is  an 
essential  part  of the  current needs  with  designated trained  personnel,  excellent 
communication channels to the Parliament and  Member States  and  the ability to 
respond calmly, and where possible, proactively in difficult circumstances. 
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These analyses  stem  from  a recognition  that  the  Commission  has  made  major 
advances  in  the organisation  of scientific advice in  the last 2 years,  but that the 
continuing  challenges  are  wideranging  and  likely to  increase as  the  Community 
expands.  The proposals  have  deliberately taken  on  board  the current range  of 
scientific advice and  the dimension of public health as  a new responsibility.  The 
present report  has  not  considered  the option  of  a completely new  public  health 
entity in  its  own  right  because experience has  shown  the crucial  links  with  food 
and  environmental  issues.  Nevertheless,  public  health  is  largely unexplored  by 
the Community as  such so the proposals for three Steering Committees  is  based 
on the need for an  initiative in  public health with the development of public health 
surveillance system for Europe.  It is recognised that these developments must be 
seen  to  be  part  of  an  evolutionary  process.  The  proposals  are  set  out  in  the 
expectation that their implementation would  greatly enhance the credibility of the 
Commission, allow a framework to  be developed for coping with  EU  enlargement 
and, it is hoped, bring clear benefits to the citizens of Europe. 
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Since  April  1997  clear  guarantees  have  been  given  to  citizens  that  the  scientific 
opinions,  upon  which  Community  legislation  on  food  safety  and  consumers'  health 
protection are based,  meet criteria of excellence,  independence and transparency. All 
the  interested  parties  (Member  States,  Parliament,  consumers  and  industry)  largely 
approved these principles. Moreover, it has been recognised that the present system of 
scientific  advice  and  in  particular  the  role  of  the  sse  represents  an  important 
improvement compared to the situation before the BSE crisis. 
Nevertheless,  a review of the working  methods  of the scientific committees  has  been 
asked  for  by  the  EP.  In  addition,  the  organisational  arrangements  have  been  the 
subject of reflections as to whether an independent agency type structure could lead to 
further  improvements  in  scientific  advice  at  the  EC  level.  In  any  case,  the  present 
committee composition will have to be renewed before October 2000. 
It  is  therefore  necessary  and  appropriate  to  prepare  the  ground  for  possible 
improvements in the EC system of scientific advice. This should be done in the light of 
•  experience with the functioning of the scientific committees since autumn 1997 
•  the  new  organisational  set-up  of  scientific  advice  developed  recently  in  some 
Member States, in  particular the UK and  France, in international organisations, e.g. 
JECFA, and, more generally, Member State systems of scientific advice 
•  the growing international importance of consumer health related issues 
•  the need for consistent, internationally acceptable risk assessment methodologies. 
Basic material on these aspects will be provided by the Commission services. 
The first task of the experts  is  to  reflect on  the purposes of the  EC  scientific advice 
system.  Normally, scientific advice will be used as input for risk management decisions 
that  directly  affect  consumers  and  industry.  Consequently,  at  least  a  triangle  of 
interests will be served by scientific advice: 
•  it should meet the needs of the authorities responsible for risk management, i.e. 
in particular the Commission, the EP and the Member States 
•  it should be geared to the objective of consumer health protection and  as  such 
confidence-building for European Consumers 
•  it  should  take  account  of  the  interests  of  industry  for  efficient  and  reliable 
procedures. 
It is clear from this that no system of scientific advice could ever claim to be "optimal" in 
view of these three often divergent basic interests. The experts are therefore asked to 
analyse the different purposes of scientific advice and their potential lines of conflict, in 
order to provide a framework against which changes in the generation and organisation 
of scientific advice can be judged. 
As a second task, the generation of scientific advice should be examined and  options 
and  recommendations  for  improvement  developed.  Quality  standards  should  be 
identified for all stages in the generation of scientific advice: 
•  the mandates for the scientific Committees or their equivalent 
•  the criteria for selecting/recruiting the persons generating scientific advice (incl. 
the secretariats) 
•  the  origin  of  the  demand  for  scientific  advice  in  particular  the  role  of  the 
scientific committees in initiating reviews of policy sensitive issues 
•  the scientific methodologies applied for risk assessment 
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finalisation of opinion, peer review 
•  openness and transparency of the process and its results. 
In  the  light  of  the  options  and  recommendations  for  improving  the  generation  of 
scientific advice,  the  third  task consists  in  presenting  options  and  recommendations 
for the organisation of scientific advice. A number of issues should be examined in this 
context: 
•  the  number,  composition  and  structure  of  scientific  committees  and 
remuneration of their members 
•  the relationship between  committee members,  expert group members  and  the 
committee secretariats 
•  the linkages between  scientific advice and  scientific research,  in  particular the 
research financed by the EC budget (JRC, DG XII etc) 
•  the potential  for synergies  between  national scientific advice systems  and  the 
Community one 
•  the need for a structured information policy related to the generation of scientific 
advice towards journalists, consumers, industry, Member States etc. 
•  the desirability to charge fees,  e.g.  for product authorisations and  its  potential 
impact on the independence of scientific advice. 
Finally,  the crucial issue of the most appropriate place for scientific advice should  be 
addressed,  in  particular with  reference to the necessary degree of independence and 
to the relationship to the Community institutions.  Different options  have already been 
advanced:  as  now,  a  directorate  in  a  DG  (but  which  one  would  be  the  most 
appropriate),  an  independent  Commission  service,  an  interinstitutional  office,  an 
independent  agency.  The  advantages  and  drawbacks  of  these  options  should  be 
examined and a recommendation should be made. 
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THE ASSOCIATIONS AND INDIVIDUALS ATTENDING A SPECIAL OPEN DAY HEARING ON THE 
FUTURE OF SCIENTIFIC ADVICE ON 4TH AND 5TH NOVEMBER, 1999 AND THOSE SUBMITTING 
SUBSEQUENT WRITTEN REPORTS 
Adamson BSMG/communication 
AESPG (Association of the European self -medication industry) 
Agra Europe: 
Akin Gump Strauss Hauer: 
Alpharma: 
APAG- Groupement europeen des produits oleochimiques et associes: 
APCO EUROPE 
BASF: 
BEUC (Bureau Europeen des Unions de consommateurs) 
Berlin Business Representation 
BKSH: 
British Retail Consortium 
CEFIC (European Chemical Council): 
CELCAAICOCERAL 
CIAA (Confederation des industries agricoles et alimentaires) 
CIFOG - Comite interprofessionnel des palmipedes a  foie gras 
CLCV (Confederation du cadre de vie/Association fran<;aise de consommateurs) 
COLIPA (European Cosmetics and Toiletry and Cosmetics Association): 
Consumer's association 
COPA  (Committee of Agricultural Organisations in the EU/Comite des organisations 
professionnelles agricoles de I'UE) 
COGECA  (General Committee of Agricultural Cooperation in the EEC/Comite general de Ia 
Cooperation agricole de Ia CEE ) 
CEJA  (European Council of Young Farmers/Conseil europeen des jeunes agriculteurs) 
DBV 
Dow Europe: 
ECPA (European Crop Association): 
EFFA (European flavour and fragance Association) 
EHPM (European health product manufacturers): 
ELC (Federation of European Food Additives and Food Enzymes Industries) 
ERNA (European Responsible Nutrition Alliance): 
EU Food Law: 
Eurocommerce 
Eurocoop 
Eurometaux 
Eurogroup for Animal welfare: 
European coalition to end animal experiment: 
European health Alliance: 
European policy Centre 
FEDESA (European federation of Animal Health 
FEFAC (Federation europeenne des fabricants d'aliments composes): 
FEFANA (Federation europeenne des fabricants d'adjuvants pour Ia Nutrition Animale) 
FRANCE SOIR 
Giordano Andrea 
Grant Bernie 
Greenpeace European Unit: 
Hill and Knowlton 
Hoffmann- Laroche: 
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Kimberly Clark 
Meat and Livestock Commission 
Novartis 
Office of Catalonia 
Patronat Catala pro Europea : 
Polish Mission to the EU 
Representation permanente danoise: 
Roche Vitamins Europe 
STOA (Scientific and Technological Options Assessment Bureau of Parliament DG IV): 
UCBV/CLITRAVI : 
UNEGA (European animal fat Processors Association) 
LIST OF STAKEHOLDER GROUPS PROVIDING WRITTEN CONTRIBUTIONS AFTER ATTENDING 
THE PUBLIC HEARINGS 
Alpharma 
BASF 
BEUC 
British Retail Consortium (BRC) 
CIAA Views on a European Food Safety Authority 
CIFOG 
Comite Europeen de Liaison des Commerces Alimentaires (CELCAA) 
COPA-COGECA: Contribution and Press Release 
European Crop Protection Association (ECPA) 
German Farmers' Union 
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Field of  Competence 
APPENDIX3 
Scientific  and  technical  questions  concerning  consumer  health  and  food  safety 
associated with the consumption of food products and  in particular questions relating to 
toxicology and hygiene in the entire food production chain, nutrition, and applications of 
agrifood  technologies,  as  well  as  those relating  to materials  coming  into contact with 
foodstuffs, such as packaging. 
Scientific Committee on Animal Nutrition 
Field of  Competence 
Scientific  and  technical  questions  concerning  animal  nutrition,  its  effect  on  animal 
health,  on  the  quality  and  health  of  products  of  animal  origin,  and  concerning  the 
technologies applied to animal nutrition. 
Scientific Committee on Animal Health and Animal Welfare 
Sub-committee on Animal Health 
Field of  Competence 
Scientific  and  technical  questions  concerning  all  aspects  of  animal  health,  hygiene, 
animal diseases and therapies, including zoonoses of non-food origin and zootechnics. 
Sub-committee on Animal Welfare 
Field of  Competence 
Scientific  and  technical  questions  concerning  the  protection  of  animals,  notably  in 
regard  to  animal  husbandry,  herd  management,  transport,  slaughter  and 
experimentation. 
Scientific Committee on Veterinary Measures relating to Public Health 
Field of  Competence 
Scientific and  technical  questions  concerning  consumer  health  and  food  safety,  and 
relating to zoonotic, toxicological, veterinary and  notably hygiene measures applicable 
to the production, processing, and supply of food of animal origin. 
Scientific Committee on Plants 
Field of  Competence 
Scientific  and  technical  questions  relating  to  plants  intended  for  human  or  animal 
consumption, production or processing of non-food products as  regards characteristics 
liable  to  affect  human  or  animal  health  or  the  environment,  including  the  use  of 
pesticides. 
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Consumers 
Field of Competence 
Scientific  and  technical  questions  concerning  consumer  health  relating  to  cosmetic 
products and non-food products intended for the consumer especially substances used 
in  the  preparation  of these products,  their composition,  use as  well  as  their types  of 
packaging. 
Scientific Committee on  Medicinal Products and Medical Devices 
Field of Competence 
Scientific  and  technical  questions  relating  to  Community  legislation  concerning 
medicaments  for  human  and  veterinary  use,  without  prejudice  to  the  specific 
competences  given  to  the  Committee  for  Proprietary  Medicinal  Products  and  the 
Committee  on  Veterinary  Medicinal  Products1  in  the  context  of  the  evaluation  of 
medicaments.  Scientific  and  technical  questions  relating  to  Community  legislation 
concerning medical materials and equipment. 
Scientific  Committee  for  Toxicity,  Ecotoxicity  and  the  Environment  Field  of 
Competence 
Scientific and technical questions relating to examinations of the toxicity and ecotoxicity 
of  chemical,  biochemical  and  biological  compounds  whose  use  may  have  harmful 
consequences for human health and the environment 
1 Committees established in the European Agency for the Evaluation of Medicinal Products 
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